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ABSTRACT
The effectiveness of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions during, Operation
Neptune, on D-Day was researched.

Through the use of memoirs written by

paratroopers who took part in the para-jump during the early morning hours of June 6,
1944 and other secondary sources written about the airborne, D-Day and the Second
World War it is possible to understand the paratroopers true value. To identify their
effectiveness the study of their objectives, casualty rates, targets destroyed in
relationship to objectives missed and overall success must be considered.
Traditionally the paratroopers of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were
looked upon as a failure. They were widely scattered, unable to regroup and often
missed their primary objectives. Military historians previously studying the airborne
argued that due to their high risk high casualty rate the paratroopers were a waste of
men and material. Until recently, with the increase in public support for the airborne
and more generally the military, former paratroopers and D-Day veterans wrote their
memoirs proclaiming their heroics and efficiency. Historians of the modern era have
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altered their perception of the paratroopers and now tend to investigate their heroics
rather than the objectives they were given while stationed in France.
The actions of the paratroopers on D-Day are heralded like the heroics of the
veterans of most American foreign wars. Although criticized shortly after the war for
their inability to secure all of the objectives given to them, they recently have received a
large amount of positive press, due to the popular media. The veterans themselves
have always believed in the good that they accomplished on D-Day. Their recent
memoirs have illustrated their heroics.
Through the paratroopers implementation of tactics and strategy they were able
to quickly and adeptly counter any offensive or defensive movements by the enemy. At
the time airborne operations were still an untested science. The airborne, although
aware of its own failures, rose to the occasion and acted in a manner befitting the
American military. The pride of American research and development also promoted
their efficiency. The Airborne’s ability to manipulate the most advanced German or
American weapons and munitions gave them a significant edge in combat.
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PREFACE
The history of the airborne on D-Day went through three very distinct
generations. The first generation took place during and shortly after the war military
historians viewed the airborne as a waste of men and material. Historians such as S.L.A.
Marshall and Napier Crookenden criticized the airborne’s actions and their lack of
completed objectives. Because their point of view was centered on the overall logistics
of the war they were not concerned with small unit combat and the tactics they used.
Although this viewpoint was justified it provided little constructive criticism for the
paratroopers. This generation is known for its critical opinion of airborne operations.
Generally, the second generation investigated the airborne with a kinder light.
Historians such as Cornelius Ryan and John Keegan allowed the airborne the ability to
destroy targets of opportunity rather than just their pre-assigned objectives. Although
they still argued that the airborne was a waste of men and material they did asses that
the confusion and chaos the airborne caused was a significant factor for the success of
D-Day. The shift in the study of the airborne can be attributed to the time. During the
mid to late nineteen eighties the backlash of the Vietnam Conflict was waning, the use
of guerilla tactics around the world was increasing and patriotism within the United
States was as high as it had been since the Second World War.
Finally the third generation of airborne history concentrated on a completely
different area than its predecessors.

Historians such as Stephen E. Ambrose and

Anthony Beevor promote the actions of the small units and individuals on D-Day.
Historians had never investigated the actions of the paratroopers on D-Day. Historians,
viii

such as Ambrose, illustrated the trauma, courage and fear the paratroopers faced
around every corner.

They discovered a different set of objectives because they

illustrated the movements and tactics of individuals and small units. These secondary
objectives contributed more to the success of D-Day then their actual mission did.
This thesis illustrates the shared thematic commonalities between those combat
elements of the individual, the group, the collective to that of the airborne’s mission.
Throughout this process it is integral to bring the history of the small combat units that
were highly motivated, trained and equipped to the forefront and away from the
individual as it is studied today or from the large scale operation that was studied during
the history’s onset.
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Chapter 1-Introduction
Airborne operations on D-Day have caused historians to discuss its validity for
the last half century. Historians and veterans alike argue the importance and lack of
importance behind the earlymorning airborne assaults on June 6, 1944. Some notable
historians argue that the airborne was largely a waste of man power and resources.
Because the airborne force was unable to accomplish all of the objectives given it by the
Allied General Staff, the airborne assault was a failure.1 They maintained that because
the airborne was so badly misdropped they became a liability for the infantry to later
have to rescue. Others argue for the intrinsic value of guerilla warfare and its ability to
destroy communication lines, disrupt enemy movements and cause general havoc
behind enemy lines. Regardless of the debate that surrounds and engulfs the history of
the airborne, a controversy exists and permeates any discussion of it.
The study of military history in the last few decades has gone through a series of
changes. The shift occurred at the end of World War Two when historians decidedly
moved towards investigating the importance behind the soldiers on the ground and the
strains of tactics and strategy. As Joan Beaumont exclaims in her article, “The General
History of the Second World War,” the military history of the Second World War and of
military history in general “has shifted away from the ‘great men’ of the conflict and
their so-called ‘decisive decisions,’ towards an emphasis on the physical material
constraints on tactics and strategy.”2 Martin van Creveld, one of the first historians to

1

See historians such as S.L.A. Marshall, Napier Crookenden and John Keegan.
Joan Beaumont, “The General History of the Second World War,” The International History Review
14(1992): 755.
2
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note the shift from ‘great men’ to the study of tactics and strategy, emphasizes the
decisions that the soldiers on the ground made over those made in Great Britain.3 One
of the only ways to ensure the validity and accuracy of a more bottom to top history is
the extensive use of oral history. The memories and writings of the people and soldiers
who fought on the ground are invaluable to a history that is not centered on great men.
In 2000, Edward M. Coffman wrote an article titled “Talking about War:
Reflections on Doing Oral History and military History” for the Journal of American
History that discussed the importance of conducting oral history in the field of military
history. He writes, “Because of the great interest in oral history about wars and the
military experience, thousands upon thousands of interviews with veterans are now
located in research institutions across the nation. Local and state historical groups have
created collections, as have the various military services.”4 These oral histories include
a wide range of different styles, topics and purposes but they all provide an indepth look
into the experiences of combat soldiers on the ground. Coffman states: “Since World
War Two, the army, navy, air force, and Marine Corps historical offices and various
subsidiary organizations have amassed thousands of oral histories. These range from
interviews to supplement research on specific topics to lengthy oral memoirs.”5
Without the use of memoirs, letters, diaries and oral histories the field of military
history would lack its most important aspect, the human element. Oral interviews

3

Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 1977.
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Edward M. Coffman, “Talking about War: Reflections on Doing Oral History and military History,” The
Journal of American History 87 (2000): 589.
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provide military history with the means to connect generations of war experiences and
with meaning and significance into the future.
The controversy over the airborne divisions during the early hours of June 6,
1944 is a simple one. Critics held that the 101st Airborne Division was unable to
complete its objectives due to extremely inaccurate drops and an inability to mobilize
quickly enough to capture the German garrisons offguard. Most historians working on
the subject suggest that the airborne was in fact ineffective during the early morning of
June 6, 1944. Critics have come to that conclusion based on the airborne’s inability to
complete all of their objectives as well as their inability to organize into a coherent order
of battle and move as one group to its tactical objectives. Historians such as S.L.A.
Marshall, Napier Crookenden and Stephen E. Ambrose believe that extremely poor
dropzone conditions forced the C-47 Dakota pilots to drop their airborne sticks at the
inappropriate times.6 Furthermore some soldiers believed that they had survived the
jump they had accomplished their mission and it was now time to survive instead of
completing the objectives given to them. Although the effectiveness of the airborne is
still debated to this day, the armament, tactics and strategy employed by the various
airborne divisions were critical to their successes, failure and ultimate survival. This
thesis explores the relationship between those combat elements and the airborne
mission. Throughout this thesis it is critical to bring the history of the airborne back

6

S.L.A. Marshall, Night Drop (New York: Bantam Books, 1962). Stephen E. Ambrose, Band of Brothers: E
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Company, 506 Regiment, 101 Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest (New York: Simon and
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from the individual efforts of the paratroopers to the investigation of small combat units
that were heavily armed and highly trained.
Paratroopers belonging to the two American Airborne divisions, the 82nd and the
101st were outfitted with the most advanced small arms and munitions available to the
Allied armies. The armament they carried into battle allowed them to survive alone and
cut off behind enemy lines while inflicting severe casualties on the enemy. They carried
modified versions of weapons used by the regular infantry as a well as new weapon
created in light of the Airborne’s specific combat or tactical needs.

Particularly

important were the modified carbine rifle, jump knife and small mobile artillery and
antitank weapons. Historian Russell F. Weigley makes note of this in his monograph of
World War Two, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany,
1944-1945: “The Garand .30-caliber M1 semi-automatic rifle was the best standard
infantry shoulder arm of the Second World War. No other rifle of the war matched its
combination of accuracy, rate of fire, and reliability.”7 The folding stock of the M1
carbine made it easier and lighter for the paratrooper to carry with ease and to use
immediately after landing in enemy territory. In order to deal with larger fortifications
and light armor, the airborne were dropped with bazookas, 2.36-inch “recoilless gun or
rocket gun,” and 75mm pack howitzers.8 These howitzers, although packing caliber
enough to destroy light armor and fortifications, were small enough in size to be carried
with gliderborn infantry or dropped by parachute. One hundred and first Airborne
7

Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign for France and Germany, 1944-1945
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 12.
8
Ibid., 11.
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Division historians Leonard Rapport and Arthur Northwood Jr. describe these pack
howitzers in Rendezvous With Destiny: A History of the 101st Airborne Division:
“Weapons were much the same as in the infantry division with predominance of the
lighter types; the artillery consisted of thirty-six 75mm pack howitzers.”9 Although
many would be destroyed during the drop or lost in the marshes that littered the
Norman environment they are a perfect example of the small alterations behind the
airborne’s armament.
In addition to weaponry, the tactics the airborne troops employed became the
foundation of modern guerilla warfare. The paratroopers were able to move in small
units that employed “search and destroy” methods seeking out important enemy
fortifications, lines of communications and reinforcements before they could be put to
use at the beach fronts. Once again Weigley writes: “If the paratroopers were scattered
unduly, the scattering confused the Germans as well, and to enhance this effect the
Americans and French Resistance busied themselves cutting communication lines.”10
This was not the ultimate objective of the airborne but its ability to disrupt enemy
movements and communications became their proudest success. Also important was
the overall strategies role of the two airborne divisions in the invasion. Regardless of
the lack of experience and the untested nature of the airborne itself they were given a
very important task to complete.

The fate of the invasions rested solely on the

shoulders of the airborne’s ability to secure the flanks of the entire invasion.
9

st

Leonard Rapport and Arthur Northwood, Jr., Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of the 101 Airborne
Division (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1948), 13.
10
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If the American Airborne Divisions were unable to secure the right and left flanks
of the invasion beaches, the Nazi forces could bring in armored divisions from the east
and infantry and supplies from the west. Yet, if the airborne could secure these flanks
that would cut off the west and provide a defendable front to the east. S.L.A. Marshall
makes note of this fact in his monograph, Night Drop. He writes: “Their tasks were to
seize the exits from Utah Beach and either seize or destroy the bridges and other
crossings of the Douve and Merderet Rivers. So doing, they would reduce the heavy
risks of the seaborne forces on the Allied right flank, which for a prolonged period would
be separated from the mass of the invasion landing well to the eastward.”11 Although
the grand strategy for the airborne may appear to have been farfetched, it was largely
successful. Ultimately the airborne was ordered to assist the invasion and destroy any
enemy reinforcements. Weigley writes, “Airborne troops were to be employed in these
operations ‘in assisting the ground forces to establish beachheads and to prevent rapid
movements of German reinforcements.’”12 Even though some of key bridgeheads,
causeways and objectives were not taken or accomplished, the airborne was still able to
prevent a major counter attack by Nazi armor or mobile infantry.
Men of the airborne were aware that once they hit the ground they would be
forced to take on objectives and targets usually reserved for much larger forces. In
Currahee! A Screaming Eagle at Normandy, Donald R. Burgett recalls a small unit poised
to take on a garrisoned city: “’Swell,” he said, ‘there are seven of us here; we’re going to

11
12

Marshall, Night Drop, 2.
Ibid., 50.

6

attack that town; you can come along if you want.’ Sure, Lieutenant, we were going
that way anyway, ’I said.”13 Throughout the Normandy Theater of Operations tactical
assaults such as this were and the steep odds contributed to the image of the airborne.
The image of the airborne would go on and continue to permeate the fabric of the
American psyche.
The image of the airborne is critical in understanding why young American men
chose to participate in such a dangerous and fairly untested division. They joined this
particular elite unit because they wanted to be the best soldiers; they wanted to fight
with the best. At a time when flying airplanes was still reserved for the elite classes of
society future paratroopers volunteered to ride and subsequently jump out of the Army
Air Corp’s C-47 Dakota transport plane. Major Richard Winters comments on the elite
nature of the airborne right before he decided to enlist in his memoir, Beyond Band of
Brothers:
After ten months of infantry training, I realized my survival would depend on the
men around me. Airborne troopers looked like I had always pictured a group of
soldiers: hard, lean, bronzed, and tough. When they walked down the street,
they appeared to be a proud and cocky bunch exhibiting a tolerant scorn for
anyone who was not airborne. So I took it in my head that I’d like to work with a
bunch of men of that caliber. The paratroopers were the best soldiers at the
infantry school and I wanted to be with the best, not with the sad sacks that I
had frequently seen on post.14

13

Donald R. Burgett, Currahee! A Screaming Eagle at Normandy (New York: Dell Publishing, 1967), 94.
Major Richard Winters, Beyond Band of Brothers: The War Memoirs of Major Dick Winters (New York,
Penguin Publishing Group, 2006), 10.
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Once again the image of the airborne is evident within Major Winters’ words. He joined
the airborne simply because of its elite reputation. The elite status also encouraged its
members to act in a manner above and beyond the call of duty.
Individual heroics have always been a part of combat. Stories harkening through
the ages show that a single man can defeat insurmountable odds. World War Two was
no different and throughout the darkness in the early morning hours of June 6, 1944
individuals and small groups of paratroopers would take on entire garrisoned cities by
themselves. An example of just one of the many acts of heroics is seen throughout
Marshall’s Night Drop. He writes: “From house to house, they changed weapons, once
covering with the carbine (Camin’s weapon) while the other broke the door in and
blasted with the Tommy gun…They took no prisoners because no chance afforded, but
firing and fighting, saying nothing to one another, they flushed some of the game
toward the flattened net of skirmishers.

Thirty Germans were killed in the five

houses.”15 Acts of heroism performed by paratroopers were common place throughout
D-Day. In most cases these gallant acts did not lead to the accomplishment of main
objectives but they did disorient, destroy and mislead enemy forces throughout
Normandy. Moreover, the paratroopers had their fair share of defeat when they landed
in France.
From the onset, the airborne encountered significant failures and complications.
Malfunctioning technology, pathfinder misdrops, weather and intense anti-aircraft (AA)
fire significantly deterred and deferred the original airborne operational plan. Even

15

Marshall, Night Drop, 171.
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though the American and British paratroopers were extremely well trained, equipped
and prepared, the German military was still able to cause significant trouble for the
Allied unit trapped behind enemy lines. Stephen T. Powers questions how it was
possible for the German Army to pose such a threat to the American and British
airborne divisions: “The focus should be upon the subordinate commanders and
formations that fought the battles. How was it possible that German troops facing
overwhelming firepower and air power, often outnumbered could mount such a
formidable resistance against the flower of the British and American armies?” 16 Units
were scattered for miles in front of and behind the dropzone. Paratroopers were forced
to march for miles in the dark in order regroup and move as a unit to their
predetermined objectives. Burgett writes: “More planes went over, but they were flying
so low, fast and scattered that it was impossible to orient myself with their direction. I
would have to play this one by instinct. In fact, all the troopers would have to it this
way. We were so widely scattered that all the months of practiced assemblies in the
dark were shot in the ass. We would have to do this one on our own.” 17 The
miscalculations of the drop itself were only the beginning for the airborne.

The

paratroopers would face more than a few complications and misdrops through their
time in the European Theater of Operations. Throughout D-Day and the rest of the war,
the airborne and the paratroopers themselves would have to adapt to the
circumstances that tended to surround and encompass its missions.

16

Stephen T. Powers, “The Battle of Normandy: the Lingering Controversy,” The Journal of Military History
56, (1992): 470.
17
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On more than one occasion paratroopers landed in France with little or no
equipment. They were forced to make do with the equipment they had, or could find or
they did without. Shortly before Operation Neptune began, the Allied General Staff
ordered the airborne to implement a leg bag that would carry the majority of the
paratrooper’s equipment and would allow him to carry more than was originally
estimated. Unfortunately military intelligence never tested the bags under combat
jump conditions. Lieutenant Elmer F. Brandenberger remembers: “When I jumped the
aircraft speed must have been at least 150 instead of the normal jumping speed. The
opening shock tore the rifle from my grasp. I can still remember the thought flashing
through my mind that it would hit some damned Kraut and bash his head in.”18
The tactical situation that the paratroopers jumped into forced them to
acclimatize to the rapid changing environment of combat in France. One such example
of this can be seen through the tactics behind the taking of the guns at Brecourt Manor
by Easy Company, 506th PIR, 101st Airborne Division. To this day the maneuver is taught
to the cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Stephen E. Ambrose
illustrates this maneuver in his monograph about Easy Company, Band of Brothers: E
Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest. He
writes:
With twelve men, what amounted to a squad (later reinforced by Speirs and the
others), Company E had destroyed a German battery that was looking straight
down causeway No. 2 and onto Utah Beach. That battery had a telephone line
running to a forward observer who was in a pillbox located at the head of
causeway No. 2. He had been calling shots down on the 4th Infantry as it
unloaded. The significance of what Easy Company had accomplished cannot be
18
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judged with any degree of precision, but it surely saved a lot of lives, and made it
much easier-perhaps even made it possible in the first instance-for tanks to
come inland from the beach.19
Because the airborne was able to implement tactics such as those used by Major
Winters they were able to take advantage of otherwise strategically impossible combat
situations. The paratroopers ability to attack targets of opportunity, find and use
weapons they may or may not have been familiar with and create and employ
improvised tactics allowed them to succeed in a situation in which many regular combat
infantry groups would have balked.
Regardless of the controversies that surround the airborne, the weapons, tactics,
strategy and image that they used and implemented assured their effectiveness in
combat. In spite of any objectives they failed to achieve or the scattered drop they
were forced to deal with the paratroopers of the airborne were still able to come
together and complete the ultimate objective of killing enemy combatants whenever
possible. Because the airborne’s worth has been in question since their formation they
always felt they had a need to meet their own destiny in combat. So much so that
airborne founding father Major General William C. Lee proclaimed that the 101 st
Airborne Division had a “Rendezvous with Destiny.”

Once again Rapport and

Northwood detail the general’s speech when they write:
The 101st…has no history, but it has a rendezvous with destiny. Like the early
American pioneers whose invincible courage was the foundation stone of this
Nation, we have broken with the past and its traditions to establish our claim to
the future. Due to the nature of our armament and the tactics in which we shall
perfect ourselves, we shall be called upon to carry out operations of far reaching

19
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military importance, and we shall habitually go into action when the need is
immediate and extreme.20
As General Lee stated the members of the airborne knew that they would be the
cornerstone of this new particular branch of the military. The entire airborne was swept
up by the notion that they were the tip of the spear head for this new world war. The
belief that the airborne had a “rendezvous with destiny” permeated the paratroopers
and the American public. Without this belief that they not only had something to prove
but were destined to prove it allowed the public and the Allied military leadership to
perceive their necessity in the war to be vital.
Through their tactics and weaponry, heroics, ingenuity and image the airborne
was able to accomplish something slightly different than the rest of the military on DDay. Although, during the mid 1940’s, American culture and society was swept up in
patriotism and the unending belief in their military the airborne was still seen as
something slightly different. Some high ranking Allied officials did see the risk that was
inherent within the notion of airborne combat infantry but their criticism were often
swept under the fervent belief in the airborne’s abilities. The Allied commander Air Vice
Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory argued with General Eisenhower over the validity of the
airborne operations on D-Day.

He persistently disputed that the risk of airborne

casualties greatly outweighed their benefit. Ambrose details this debate in his D-Day
monograph, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. He explains: “He
told Eisenhower, ‘We must not carry out this airborne operation.’ He predicted 70
percent losses in glider strength and at least 50 percent in paratroop strength even
20

Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny, 3.
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before the paratroopers hit the ground.”21 The estimated loss of the life was always a
distinct worry for Allied Commanders but what they could not for see at the time was
not the in-air casualties but the casualties that would occur immediately after landing
due to the marshes and obstacles created by the Nazis and the inability to rearm,
reinforce and eventually retrieve airborne units trapped behind enemy lines for days on
end.
Although some groups of paratroopers ran low on ammunition and supplies and
had little if any hope for reinforcement they were still able to fight valiantly and either
take objectives or hold enemy forces in check until the regular infantry could assemble
to take them. Most of the young men composing the airborne had never seen combat
before. A select group of paratroopers from the 82 nd Airborne Division that survived
action in Italy had taken fire but the large majority would receive their baptism by fire in
Normandy. Koskimaki writes: “Perhaps D-Day doesn’t stand out as the most exciting
day in the lives of the surviving 101st Airborne soldiers, but it was their baptism by fire.
First impressions are lasting impressions. Lessons were quickly learned. It didn’t take
the men long to distinguish between the ripping sounds of enemy guns and the staccato
of American weapons.”22 As soon as the paratroopers jumped from the planes they
were subjected to intense enemy fire and once they landed in France they were forced
to quickly adapt to the sounds of combat in Nazi occupied France.

Through the

extensive training that they received the paratroopers were able to move past the fear
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and hopelessness that was evident and overcome any obstacles that were placed in
front of them.
Although historical thought on the subject leans toward suggesting that the
airborne operations on D-Day were not effective, the men themselves never believed
that. Although not completing all of their objectives they were still effective in that they
were able to distract, destroy and cause confusion and havoc amongst the German
garrisons all across the Norman Coast and the Cherbourg Peninsula. Memoirs from
members of the 101st Airborne Division tell a completely different story. These brave
paratroopers related a story of extreme heroism and courage under fire.

These

memoirs note the confusion and terrible inaccuracy of the drop itself but also tell the
ability of each individual paratrooper to regroup with other paratroopers and move
toward their objectives. The memoirs of these paratroopers paint a different picture
from what the historical record has created over the last sixty-four and a half years.
Here a clear line is drawn between what historians of the field believed and what the
paratroopers who were there believed about the actions they committed on June 6,
1944. The question as to whether or not the 101 st Airborne Division was or was not
effective toward the overall success of D-Day is a complex one to answer. Based on
research from both historical texts and memoirs I will try and negotiate a clear and
unbiased answer. First, however, the history of the 101 st Airborne Division prior to DDay is necessary in order to understand the circumstances in which these paratroopers
fought and died in France. This thesis will investigate the different ways the American
airborne proved to be successful on D-Day. First this investigation will address the
14

previous history of the airborne. Through its changing faces the airborne’s abilities were
and are always in question. Next, I will discuss the creation, organization and doctrine
of the airborne. From its onset, the mission of airborne operations has always been
somewhat murky.

Most militaries in the world had experimented with airborne

operations but few failed to implement them effectively.
paratrooper’s actions on D-Day.

Next I will discuss the

On June 6, 1944 American and Allied troops in

Normandy were forced to use their training and skill. By investigating the airborne
while at the most disorganized and weak it is possible to view their most impressive
achievements. Finally, an investigation of the airborne’s tactics and weaponry is integral
in understanding whether or not they were effective. Because the paratroopers went
into combat with the most advanced weaponry and knowledge of tactics available to
the Allies it greatly improved their ability to survive.

The manner in which the

paratroopers employed these tactics and weapons is crucial to understanding how they
were successful as an elite guerilla unit.
This thesis is intended to change the manner in which the history of the airborne
is study. There has already been three different and distinct generations. However no
investigation of the airborne has illustrated their real effectiveness as small guerilla
units. Historians have usually castigated the paratroopers for their use of small squad
tactics when, in fact, this strategy provided for their greatest successes on D-Day. Using
oral history, memoirs, and secondary sources such as monographs on World War Two I
intend to prove that, the previously untested, asymmetrical combat strategy propelled
the airborne forces of the United States to successes in the field that they had not
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prepared for. The airborne operations were successful in that a group of highly trained,
equipped and motivated paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines and successfully
engaged an entrenched and fortified enemy. The objectives given to the airborne
before the combat jump were not appropriate for parachute infantry. Once on the
ground the paratrooper’s took on a new set of objectives that were more appropriate to
small groups. This research is necessary because history has failed to examine the
importance of small groups of paratroopers. It has, instead, illustrated the failures of
the regiment as a whole or conversely, the successes of the individual. The ability for a
group of highly skilled paratroopers carrying the most advanced weaponry to disrupt
the enemy was crucial to the Allied success during the invasion of Normandy.
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Chapter 2-Historiography of a Drop
The historiography of the airborne on D-Day is broken into three very distinct
generations. First the achievements of the airborne were largely castigated by scholars.
It was said that because they did not regroup as a division and complete they objectives
they were a failure.

The second generation of history surrounding the airborne

concentrates more on the successes of the paratroopers. However, still failed to
acknowledge how they accomplished them. In addition to that, scholars still asserted
that the airborne operations as a whole were a failure. Finally, the third generation
celebrates the individual efforts of the paratroopers. Although this is a significant
alteration from previous generations it still fails to address how the paratroopers were
able to achieve some of the objectives they did. Instead historians and veterans alike
tend to focus on the paratrooper’s individual successes and failures. The historiography
of the airborne has yet to illustrate how the paratroopers were able to accomplish all
that they had on D-Day. Without the study of small unit and group tactics it is
impossible to understand how the paratroopers were able to accomplish all that they
had on D-Day.
Investigations into the successes and failures of the airborne occurred even as
soldiers of the 101st and 82nd were fighting in the hedge rows of Normandy in the
summer of 1944.

Curiosity had reigned throughout the world as the airborne

experiment was tested at its onset in Italy, the Soviet Union and Germany in the mid
1930s. Although these countries implemented and researched the notion of airborne
combat troops, only Germany implemented. The Nazi Fallschirmjäger achieved minor
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victories in Norway and Greece before being relegated to elite combat infantry.
Regardless of the obvious difficulties and failures of airborne operations the United
States and Great Britain began their own airborne divisions.
Time has greatly changed the study and outlook of the airborne since the Second
World War. There were three major changes in the study of the American airborne.
First, during and shortly after the end of World War Two, historians believed that their
use was largely a waste of men and materials. Second, during the 1980’s and 1990’s,
historians altered their perception of the effectiveness of the airborne and wrote that
not only were they successful but without their participation on D-Day the outcome
would have been different. Finally, after the successes of some of these histories,
during the early 2000’s throughout popular culture, a third wave of historical work
appeared. Largely this third wave consisted of the memoirs of paratroopers who
participated on D-Day and their opinion of the successes and failures of their actions.
Throughout the last seventy years the opinion of historians and scholars
regarding the airborne has fluctuated. Previous historians of American military history
and the airborne, like S.L.A. Marshall, Cornelius Ryan and Napier Crookenden, have
decidedly negative views of the airborne and whatever accomplishments they may
have. While new scholars, such as Stephen E. Ambrose, John Keegan and George E.
Koskimaki, have a much more positive view of their actions during World War II.
Although it is hard to determine the cause of these shifts in the history of the airborne,
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it is clear that their strategic value is in question. The variation between the opinions of
scholars about the airborne makes the study of its true effectiveness very interesting.
S.L.A. Marshall, the official historian for the U.S. military during World War Two,
enlisted in the army in 1919 and would later be awarded a battlefield commission of
lieutenant. Between wars Marshall worked as a journalist in El Paso, Texas, and Detroit,
Michigan and became one of the foremost military historians. Marshall was present in
every American war from World War One to Vietnam. Shortly after World War Two,
Marshall gained notoriety for his report and later monograph, Men against Fire, when
he claimed that only thirty percent of American combat infantrymen fired their
weapons. His monograph, Night Drop, details the airborne operations that occurred in
the early morning hours of June 6, 1944.
Each historian had a different purpose when constructing their monographs of
the war or the airborne. Their individual backgrounds, education and the era in which
they wrote also greatly influenced their motivations for assembling their theses. An
example is Marshall’s investigation of the American airborne. Marshall intended for
Night Drop to explain the chaos and confusion that occurred on D-Day and in airborne
operations in general. The president, the general staff and even the commanders of the
airborne itself demanded an explanation for the high casualty rate and the disorder that
occurred at the drop zones. On such cause that Marshall outlines is the inability of the
paratroopers to orient themselves properly. “When paratroopers are misdropped by
night,” says Marshall, “into combat and become lost, instinctively they react like water
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and flow downhill. Reassembly comes about because, automatically, many men drift
toward the drainage lines.”23 Much of Marshall’s monograph castigates the airborne
and their inability to capture and hold all of their objectives. Marshall does not believe
that the airborne, although courageous, were a proper use of wartime personnel and
materials.
Another historian and scholar who believed that airborne operations should
have been limited on D-Day was journalist and military historian Cornelius Ryan. Ryan,
born in Dublin, flew fourteen bombing missions with the Eighth and Ninth Air Wings and
was attached to General Patton’s Third Army as he drove across Western Europe during
World War Two. Ryan trained as a journalist before the war and quickly became known
as one of the world’s foremost war correspondents. He has written several monographs
about different operations that took place, including his epic about Operation Market
Garden. Both A Bridge Too Far and The Longest Day: The Classic Epic of D-Day, June 6,
1944 were translated into over nineteen languages and are well regarded within the
historical community.
Ryan had an opinion of airborne operations similar to Marshall’s, The Longest
Day: The Classic Epic of D-Day, June 6, 1944. His investigation analyzes every aspect of
the invasion of Normandy on D-Day. Throughout his examination of the Allied efforts,
he dedicates a rather large portion of his monograph to the airborne operations that
took place during the early morning hours of June 6. Much like Marshall, Ryan believed
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that the casualties inflicted on the airborne would be devastating. Ryan goes so far as
to describe General Eisenhower’s own hesitation: “He was more worried about the
airborne operation than about any other phase of the assault.” Ryan states, “Some of
his commanders were convinced that the airborne assault might produce more than
eighty percent casualties.”24

Even in the hours before the airborne operations

commenced there was more than a reasonable doubt about the possibility of the
operation’s success. However high the casualty rate and chaos were, Ryan maintained,
the allied airborne operations still had several major and minor successes.
Lieutenant General Sir Napier Crookenden, a senior British military advisor
during the 1960s, was a British Airborne Brigade commander during World War Two.
During the war he was a proponent of airborne operations on D-Day and in Holland.
After the war he continued to serve in the British military until his retirement.
Throughout his retirement, he became an avid historian of the airborne operations that
took place during the war. While constructing his several monographs about the
airborne, Dropzone Normandy and Airborne at War, he researched under the tutelage
of Cornelius Ryan, which greatly influenced his own writing and research. Although he
may be a lesser-known historian of the airborne, his insights into the weaponry, tactics
and strategies of paratroopers on the ground in France provides an unparalleled source.
His monograph about the operations that took place on D-Day is particularly
valuable because it provides firsthand experience through a secondary source. Marshall
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and Ryan tended to be critical of the costs, casualties and chaos that the airborne
incurred on D-Day. Crookenden, although slightly critical of the execution, believed that
the successes that the paratroopers had outweighed its failures.

He asserts that

although the drops themselves were skewed and off target, the ability of the
paratroopers to regroup in mostly small combat teams and in some cases large numbers
was their true success. He explains one such circumstance: “The day had been one of
small-scale platoon, section and individual fights at Mesieres, St. Martin, Foucarville and
Haut Fournel. The majority of the regiment were still missing from the drop and many
men had been killed and wounded, but the regiment’s tasks had been completed and it
had inflicted heavy casualties.”25 Although his tone may contain a negative connotation,
a shift is already beginning to occur in the historiography of the field. Crookenden
asserts that the airborne had several major successes in the field on D-Day. He would
not be the only historian, journalist or scholar to believe so by the end of the century.
During the 1990s, airborne history received renewed attention. At the tip of this
surge was historian Stephen E. Ambrose.

Ambrose received his Ph.D. from the

University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1963 and was a professor of history at many
universities, including the University of New Orleans and the Naval War College, in the
United States. He was also the Explorer in Residence for the National Geographic
Society and was the founder of the Eisenhower Center at the National World War Two
Museum in New Orleans, Louisiana. His analyses of World War Two are known as some
of the finest modern work written about the war. His two major works, Band of
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Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s
Nest and D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II, provide a wealth of
knowledge about the strategic and tactical value of the war and the airborne. Although
there are some criticisms about the integrity of his work, his monographs on D-Day and
the 101st Airborne Division are invaluable accounts of the war.
Ambrose’s history of the airborne, Band of Brothers, analyzes the intrinsic value
of airborne operations on D-Day by examining the successes of small groups of
paratroopers rather than whole regiments or divisions. He argues that although not all
of the division’s objectives were accomplished, they were still able to disrupt
communications, destroy supply lines and form search and destroy parties. Ambrose
writes: “All across the peninsula, throughout the sight and into the day of D-Day,
paratroopers were doing the same-fighting skirmishes, joining together in ad hoc units,
defending positions, harassing the Germans, trying to link up with their units. This was
exactly what they had been told to do.”26 According to Ambrose, the paratroopers not
only did what they were ordered to do but executed their missions well. Moreover,
paratroopers across Normandy took the initiative and attacked targets of opportunity as
they appeared. His monograph about Easy Company became the catalyst for the
reprinting of old memoirs and in some cases the catalyst for former paratroopers to
write new ones.
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Sir John Keegan is the foremost military historian of the Second World War. His
monographs on D-Day, World War Two and the social and personal consequences of
battle are the foundation for any study of the Second World War, War or even combat
in general. He was an instructor at the British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
Throughout this time he also was a visiting lecturer at Princeton and a Distinguished
Professor at Vassar. Some of his most prestigious monographs about combat and World
War Two are The Face of Battle, Six Armies at Normandy and The Second World War.
His analytical method compares the national historical character of each combatant
nation with the decisive phase of the campaign in which each struggled. He compares
the dashing and desperate courage of American paratroopers to their counterparts in
other nations.
Keegan’s text Six Armies at Normandy discusses the importance of D-Day but
emphasizes that it was only the beginning of a much larger conflict. His research on the
airborne bridges its old history populated by historians such as Marshall with that of its
new history. Keegan does not go as far as to address small unit actions on D-Day but
does assert that they did achieve some objectives. However he still does not go as far as
to argue that the airborne was worth the money, training and equipment entrusted to
them. On more than one occasion he claims that the paratroopers were merely
participating in the background: “No general anywhere would consider sending
formation en masse against prepared positions, and the role of the parachutist would
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dwindle to that of the clandestine interloper.” 27

Keegan’s research provided the

foundation for the new study of the airborne. Although he may not be as positive about
the airborne as Ambrose or the veterans themselves he does give them credit for the
work they did on D-Day.
George E. Koskimaki, a noted historian and member of the 101 st Airborne
Division, compiled the letters, diary entries, interviews and experiences of over five
hundred different members of the airborne. His has written several different works on
the airborne and their exploits throughout the war. Some of his most famous accounts
of the airborne are Battered Bastards of Bastogne and Hell’s Highway: Chronicle of the
101st Airborne Division in the Holland Campaign, September - November 1944 both of
which recall some of the most courageous and brutal fighting the airborne has ever
seen. His work provides insight into the decision-making process that each paratrooper
had on D-Day.
In his compilation D-Day with the Screaming Eagles Koskimaki portrays the
efforts of the airborne as nothing less than heroic. He does outline the successes and
failures that occurred on D-Day but he decidedly weighs their successes over their
failures. Koskimaki writes: “There would be larger airborne operations planned in the
future, such as the assault on Holland and the jump across the Rhine. However, never
again would the Allies attempt a large-scale night landing from the sky. The operation
had eased the way for the seaborne troops, but the airborne soldiers had paid a heavy
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price for that success.”28 Because of the high casualty rate, the general staff and
popular opinion decided that the airborne operations were too costly to be considered a
success.

Although technically not histories, the memoirs, letters and diaries of

paratroopers became the harbingers of the history of the airborne.
Members of the airborne have always believed in the worth of their struggles
and sacrifices. Paratroopers began writing their memoirs while in combat all over
Western Europe.

Although not trained as historians, paratroopers constructed

memories that continue to be some of the most useful and insightful sources. One such
resource is Major Richard Winters, the commander of easy Company 506th Parachute
Infantry Regiment. He wrote his memoirs about his experiences in World War Two.
Winters, born and raised in Pennsylvania, graduated from Franklin and Marshall College
in 1941 with a degree in business with honors. Upon his graduation he immediately
enlisted in the army and soon he was accepted into Officer Candidate School (OCS) and
joined the airborne. His exploits in World War Two are some of the most well-known
and he was requested to train new paratroopers during the Korean Conflict in the
1950’s. Some argue that his memoirs simply retell the story presented by HBO’s
miniseries Band of Brothers because it was published so late in his life. However, his
memoir provides insight into the experiences of a parachute infantryman regardless of
his motivations for writing them.
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His memoir, Beyond Band of Brothers: The War Memoirs of Major Dick Winters,
gives an account of his time with Easy Company. Beginning his time in the 506th
Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) as a Second Lieutenant and later as its captain, he
offers a history of the airborne with both a bottom-up and top-down view. Not only did
he drop and fight in Normandy, but he also became Easy Company’s first combat
commander due to the death of his immediate superior. Throughout his memoir, he
argues that although some of the objectives given to his company were not
accomplished, more pressing objectives were completed that could not have been
outlined before his combat troops encountered them on the ground. One such occasion
he details is his command of the destroying of a German artillery battery at Brecourt
Manor. He remembers: “Even though Easy Company was still widely scattered, the
small portion that fought at Brecourt had demonstrated the remarkable ability of the
airborne trooper to fight, albeit outnumbered, and to win. This sort of combat typified
the independent action that characterized the American Airborne divisions that jumped
into Normandy. Once the battle began, discipline and training overcame our individual
and collective fears.”29 It is clear that Major Winter’s memoirs are a primary source
containing his personal recollections of the war, but it is still a significant contribution to
the historiography because it set a precedent for the current study of the history of the
airborne.
Marshall’s purpose in writing Night Drop was to examine and analyze the
successes and failures of airborne operations on D-Day. Marshall constructed his
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monograph to show his readers, the general staff and other military commanders, that
the airborne is a viable option for future conflicts. His intentions were to analyze
whether the airborne was able to accomplish their mission with an acceptable casualty
rate. Marshall writes:
Some of the sticks which he had dreamed would form on him were now crawling
half-drowned from the marshes. Others had far overshot the mark, and getting
the green light after they had passed over the Division area, came down isolated
in enemy country. Their problem became one of evasion and survival. When
Ames walked out in the direction they had taken, he was one of the wisest men
in Normandy-the first to know that the 82nd Division plan had fallen apart.30
Throughout his monograph Marshall goes on to dictate, piecemeal, how the airborne
operations on D-Day had few successes with extremely high casualties. On the other
hand, Ryan’s purpose is somewhat different. He intends to write a detailed analysis and
investigation of D-Day for a far different audience. Unlike Marshall, Ryan illustrates, to a
general audience of arm chair historians and the public, the heroics and failures that
occurred on D-Day. Although, at times, he tends to castigate the airborne and their
abilities he is still able to examine their successes in depth. Ryan writes: “It was nearly
dawn-the dawn that eighteen thousand paratroopers had been fighting toward. In less
than five hours they had more than fulfilled the expectations of General Eisenhower and
his commanders.”31

Although Ryan’s complimentary attitude seems to encourage

future airborne operations, he hopes to demonstrate that the airborne played a minor
role in the success of D-Day.
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Crookenden, like Marshall, writes for a specific audience aware and
knowledgeable of the military operations during World War Two. Much like Marshall,
he hopes to demonstrate the successes and failures that occurred on D-Day. However,
he solely concentrates on the airborne operations. He provides a wealth of information
about the tactics, strategies and weaponry used while on the ground in the early
morning hours of June 6. Throughout his monograph, Dropzone Normandy he imposes
upon the reader the firepower and training that paratroopers respectively carried and
underwent. Crookenden writes: “The men of the two US Airborne divisions were well
equipped for their task, except that the age-old tendency persisted to overload the
individual soldier in an attempt to allow for every emergency.” 32 He demonstrates the
importance of the training that the paratroopers received and the equipment that they
carried. Without the advances in technology, equipment and training, the outcome of
airborne operations on D-Day would have been vastly different.

Crookenden’s

interpretation began to change historiography about the airborne.
Although Crookenden may have started the new historiography of the airborne
Ambrose promulgated advanced and popularized it. Both of his monographs about DDay, Band of Brothers and D Day: June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II,
highlight the heroism of individuals and small groups of soldiers and paratroopers. Band
of Brothers, Ambrose’s monograph about a company of paratroopers, greatly influenced
the history of the airborne and how it would be written in the future. He hoped to
demonstrate the importance and heroics behind paratroopers throughout Normandy.
32

Crookenden, Dropzone Normandy, 31.

29

He writes: “A German machine-gun opened fire on the group.

When it did, the

prisoners tried to jump the Americans. Guarnere shot them with his pistol. ‘No
remorse,’ he said when describing the incident forty-seven years later. ‘No pity. It was
as easy as stepping on a bug.’”33 Through writing his monograph Ambrose hopes to
demonstrate the heroics found throughout the airborne are unmatched by any other
outfit in the history of D-Day.
Another interesting example of airborne historiography is the memoir of Major
Richard Winters. After Ambrose wrote his epic monograph about Easy Company it
spurred many of the paratroopers of this company and the airborne in general to
compose their own memoirs. One such of these cases was the popular character of
Major Winters throughout Band of Brothers. Upon the publication and production of
the book and miniseries respectively he was one of the many paratroopers to write his
own memoirs. His memoirs captivate the reader by illustrating the detailed actions that
his men and he endured while in Europe.

Like Koskimaki, he does not fail to

mythologize the heroics of the airborne. Winters retells Sergeant H.G. Nerhood D-Day
story:
“My grandfather was on the beach getting his butt kicked. Your men were at the
guns, kicking butt and saving his, along with hundreds more. Had you not
succeeded, I might not be alive this day to tell you how deeply grateful I am that
Easy Company accomplished its mission and saved the lives of a lot of men that
day.” H.R. Nerhood and Eliot Richardson were but two soldiers who survived
Utah Beach because of the destruction of the Brecourt battery.34
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On the other hand, Winters is not a trained historian. Secondly, his work is a work of
memoirs and thus a primary source. Although it is not usually prudent to include
primary sources throughout a historiographic investigation, they are important because
they show the changing face of the history of the airborne and the affect of popular
history’s analysis of it. Without the inspiration of Ambrose’s monographs it is likely that
memoirs like that of Major Winters never would have been created.
The argumentation used throughout the airborne historiography is pretty
consistent. Historians like Marshall and Ryan demonstrated the train of thought behind
the tactics of airborne operations on D-Day. For the time period in which they wrote
their investigations their arguments are sound and reliable. However at the time, the
justifications behind their investigations were to identify the successes and failures of
the objectives handed down to the airborne from the general staff at the Allied
Command. Marshall dictated this in the prologue of his monograph Night Drop. He
writes: “They were to hit in the flat hedgerow country inland from Utah Beach five
hours before the small boats touched down. Their tasks were to seize the exits from
Utah Beach and either seize or destroy the bridges and other crossing of the Douve and
Merderet Rivers.”35 Like Marshall, Ryan has a very similar argument. His argues that
the objectives that the airborne had were the anchor for the entire invasion of France.
He writes: “To the Americans went the job of holding the right flank of the invasion area
just as their British counterparts were hold on the left. But much more was riding on
the American paratroopers: on them hung the fate of the whole Utah Beach
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operation.”36 The arguments that Ryan provides are relevant the evidence that both
Marshall and Ryan supply enhance their monographs. Although both monographs are
extremely relevant to the field they fail to answer all of the questions their sources ask.
Crookenden and Ambrose advance the historiography with the arguments they
provide. Like the previous historians, Crookenden does investigate the airborne’s ability
to complete their objectives. However he does include their ability to successfully find
and destroy targets of opportunity. Crookenden illustrates: “Sergeant Snyder now
returned to report that his patrol had cleaned out St. Martin and killed a number of
Germans in position by the church. The patrol was at once sent back to hold the village
and a message radioed to the 4th Division that Exit and Causeway 4 were clear.”37
Although other historians have commented on the guerilla tactics employed by the
airborne on D-Day Crookenden is one of the first. Rather than investigating the tactical
situation like Marshall, Ryan and Crookenden, Ambrose chooses to investigate the
heroic acts of the airborne versus its tactical failures. The heroics of the airborne
touched on by Crookenden were only developed twenty years later by Ambrose. He
does not fail to mythologize the actions of the airborne. Using the personal statements
of paratroopers like Major Winters provides his monograph with an implausible sense of
realism during an unbelievable action. Because this side of the airborne’s history has
never really been told it is extremely relevant to the field. In a history that, for much of
its scholarship was based solely on its military importance, Ambrose’s work provides a
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human face for a history whose foundation was built on numbers of troops and tactical
and strategic plans.

These kind of histories demonstrates the social dynamics of

combat.
Finally Koskimaki and Winters add another aspect to the humanity behind the
mythology and military history of the airborne. Both Koskimaki and Winters provide an
in depth and in one case personal analysis. Koskimaki argues that, although recent
popular history and Hollywood have brought the history of the airborne into the
limelight, Koskimaki claims that the personal experiences of the paratroopers
themselves are fading into oblivion. Without works such as his, the memories of the
airborne will disappear and the only thing that will remain will be the history of the
tactical successes and failures during their operations.

He explains this in his

introduction when he writes: “The feats of the airborne troopers may soon fade into
legend as the helicopter replaces the parachute and glider, but while the tale can be
told, let these exploits of the sky invaders of Hitler’s Fortress Europa become part of the
annals of history.”38 Although firsthand accounts are not new to the historiography the
interviews that Koskimaki used are different. Instead of describing the tactical and
strategic situation on D-Day, he asked for their personal feelings and experiences.
Instead of hearing about division-wide movements and actions Koskimaki wanted to
illustrate small group tactics and individual actions.
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Finally, the arguments of Major Winters are vastly different than those of
previous historians because his monograph examines his own personal experiences
versus others paratroopers. Once again, it may not be typical to include a primary
source in a historiographic analysis but the airborne’s changing history throughout the
last decade is partly due to the emergence of primary sources such as his. He argues
that the memories and the memories of his fellow paratroopers the he maintains will
die with him unless he publishes them for future generations to see. He writes: “Age is
creeping up and taking its toll, and as what war correspondent Ernie Pyle called ‘the old
fraternity of war’ enmeshes me one final time, I want to honor the men I served with by
telling as best I can the ‘untold stories.’ Many of these stories are from men who are no
longer with us, and I can think of no better legacy for them and their families.” 39 Like
Koskimaki, who provides analyses for countless memoirs, diaries, letters and journal
entries, Winters hopes to disseminate the heroic and sometimes mythic actions of his
fellow paratroopers. Because their works are slightly less historical than those written
by trained historians in search of a detailed outline to place in their own works these
men hope to influence future generation and retell the stories of hundreds of young
men who could not tell their own story while they were alive.
Thematically speaking, all of these historians and authors provide an overarching
thematic presence within their monographs. In addition to that all add something new
to the historiography of the airborne. An example of a thematic presence within a
monograph about the airborne is seen throughout Marshall’s monograph Night Drop.
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The historical paradigm that he chooses to employ is the importance of the airborne’s
achievements on D-Day and how they impacted the general allied objective of capturing
the Cherbourg Peninsula. “It was the task of the U.S. VII Corps, landing at Utah,
commanded by Major General J. Lawton Collins, to capture Cherbourg.” Marshall
writes, “The two airborne divisions were part of that corps. This is the story only of their
first days when they fought nigh unhelped.”40 Differently than Marshall, Ryan hopes to
illustrate to the reader that the members of the airborne and all of the soldiers involved
in D-Day were average people, not heroes or military masterminds. He writes: “What
follow is not a military history. It is the story of people: the men of the Allied forces, the
enemy they fought and the civilians who were caught up in the bloody confusion of DDay –the day the battle began that ended Hitler’s insane gamble to dominate the
world.”41 Ryan is able to encompass the history of D-Day through the lens of Social
History. He analyzes the importance of people throughout the world’s most infamous
war. Both Marshall and Ryan hoped to prove that the purpose of and the people who
fought on D-Day are different than what popular history and the general public believe.
Marshall and Ryan also provide a significant amount of information to the
historiography of the field as well. Marshall became known as the foundation for the
field. He was the first trained historian to investigate the successes and failures of the
airborne. He had the privilege of interviewing and investigating the airborne during the
war itself. Without his examination of D-Day and the airborne their history would be
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vastly different than it is today. On the other hand, Ryan, who wrought one of the first
histories of D-Day in the form of a novel, was able to add a name and a face to those
who fought.

Marshall and Ryan laid the foundation for future historians and

paratroopers who would later compose their memoirs.
Other historians, like Crookenden, employed a different thematic paradigm
throughout his text. He utilizes military history itself as his overarching thematic
presence. Although Marshall used a similar theme, Crookenden thoroughly relies on it
throughout his entire text. He is sure to note the military achievements above all else:
“In the Cotentin peninsula the two United States divisions had overcome the difficulties
of their scattered drop and inflicted heavy casualties on the German 709 th and 91st
Divisions and the 6th Parachute Regiment. The American 4th, 90th and 9th Divisions were
ashore and moving north towards Cherbourg and west to St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte over
the causeways and bridges captured by the airborne troops.”42 By using his extensive
knowledge of military history as his foundation Crookenden is able to produce a truly
valuable investigation of the airborne. He analyzes, in great detail, the airborne’s
tactical and strategic effect on D-Day.

Similarly to Ryan, Ambrose’s overarching

paradigm of historical interpretation is social history. He believes that the true history
of the Easy Company and the airborne lies within their remarkable closeness. He writes:
I became curious about how this remarkable closeness had been developed. It is
something that all armies everywhere throughout history strive to create but seldom
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do, and never better than with Easy.”43 It is interesting to note that both Ryan and
Ambrose nearly utilize the same overarching thematic presence even thought their
purposes are vastly different. Ambrose’s interpretation of Easy Company and the
airborne provides a new examination of their achievements on D-Day. Never before has
such a personal retelling of history affected such a renewal and change in the
historiography of a subject.
Crookenden and Ambrose contribute different things to the understanding of
the airborne. Crookenden provides an in depth analysis of how the airborne faired
militarily. He investigate every decisions made by every commander, NCO and private
using his own initiative affected the outcome of the airborne’s objectives. Although
most historians of the airborne have provided an examination of their military prowess
they fail to look at how small unit tactics affected the more general objectives. On the
other hand, Ambrose adds the personal feelings, emotions and fears of the men fighting
on the ground. Never before have historians taken such a personal look into the life and
times of a soldier while in combat. Other than the paratroopers themselves, with their
memoirs, the experiences and emotions of paratrooper on the ground have never
before been revealed within a historical text.
Finally, Koskimaki and Winters provide a different set of historical paradigms
throughout their monographs. Koskimaki illustrates throughout his compilation that the
paratroopers themselves had some concept before during and after joining the airborne
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that they had a “rendezvous with destiny” as the motto of the 101 st Airborne Division
dictates. He writes: “I believe, down to the least imaginative one, really felt a close
affinity with history. Something big was about to happen and we were going to be a
part of it. The most terrible thing that could have happened to any one of us would
have been to be scratched from the loading manifest.”44 Finally Major Winters provides
a different overarching historical paradigm because his monograph is a memoir.
Throughout his memoirs, he hopes to portray to the reader that World War II brought
the best of his men and himself. He demonstrates that although war is terrible it forces
the best out of its participants. He writes:
War brings out the worst and the best in people. Wars do not make men great,
but they do bring out the greatness in good men. War is romantic only to those
who are far away from the sounds and turmoil of battle. For those of us who
served in Easy Company and for those who served their country in other
theaters, we came back as better men and women as a result of being in
combat, and most would do it again if called upon. But each of us hoped that if
we had learned anything from the experience, it is that war is unreal and we
earnestly hoped that it would never happen again.45
Throughout his memoirs Winters believes that he and his paratroopers were destined to
do great things. It is interesting to note that the airborne’s achievements were not
considered to be heroic until the early 1990’s and Ambrose’s monograph Band of
Brothers. This is of particular note because Major Winters himself did not write his
memoirs until after the year 2000 and the extremely popular HBO miniseries Band of
Brothers.
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In general the historiography of the airborne on D-Day, the biggest
disagreements within the field come in whether the efforts of the airborne were a
success or failure. Even this disagreement is more temporal than historic in nature.
Early historians of the field were sure, based on the accomplishment of objectives, that
they were a bigger liability than success. As time went on, history and the public
changed and the historiography seemed to favor heroism rather than objectives. That
being said, newer historians never ceased to draw upon their earlier counterparts when
constructing their own works. Crookenden, Ambrose and even Koskimaki drew heavily
upon Marshall and Ryan.
Though they might not have agreed with the theses and arguments that they
promoted they still relied heavily on their source base. In general the historiography of
the airborne relies almost completely on the personal memoirs, interviews, diaries and
letters of the paratroopers themselves. Most of these were and are considered to be
the most important memories and treasures of the war. George E. Koskimaki says it the
best when he writes: “They sent clippings from hometown newspapers which proud
parents had sent to editors in the form of first letters from the combat zone. Parachute
manifests were sent along with comments about the fate of some of their close buddies.
Always with the admonition, ‘Please take care of this material-it is my really great
treasure of the war.’”46 To these men their memories are more important than the
flags, watches and weapons they recovered from their enemies. The methodology that
these historians use, regardless of their purpose, is largely the same throughout. It is
46
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almost as if their primary sources were passed from generation to generation of
historians. However, it is important to reiterate the fact that until the popularization of
the airborne through Ambrose’s monograph Band of Brothers and HBO’s Band of
Brothers miniseries spurned the creation of many new memoirs of paratroopers. In
addition to that, most of the memoirs written by members of Easy Company, 506 th PIR,
101st Airborne Division largely mirror themselves.
The historiography of the airborne provides an interesting case study for
analysis. It is not uncommon for the history of a group or their actions to change as
time progresses. However the historiography of the airborne is particularly interesting
because several aspects of its history have changed. Primarily, the subject matter itself
has gone through a transformation. During and shortly after the conclusion of the war,
historians investigated the tactical and strategic successes and failures based on their
ability to achieve the objectives set out to them by General Eisenhower and the allied
general staff.

From there the subject changed to the personal heroics of the

paratroopers themselves and their ability to successfully accomplish objectives based
upon targets of opportunity. Secondly and encompassing the transformation of their
history was the public’s opinion of the airborne’s effectiveness on D-Day. At first, due to
the negative press they received from historians of the time, the public believed that
airborne operations were largely a waste of man power and resources. In recent
history, the airborne has been immortalized and mythologized due to the writings of
modern historians, film makers and the memoirs of the paratroopers themselves.
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It is important to note that all of these historians and historians of the field in
general have thoroughly illuminated the history of the airborne today. Marshall, Ryan,
Crookenden, Ambrose, Koskimaki, Ambrose and Winters all provide different histories
of the airborne that all add up to a thorough investigation of their achievements and
sacrifices. As time passes and there are fewer and fewer veterans left alive to provide
their history of World War Two the study of their heroics becomes more stable.
Although the study of their history may have had its fair share of transformations
throughout the last sixty years the paratroopers themselves have never changed their
opinion of their actions. They always believed what they did was crucial to the success
of the D-Day invasion and more importantly the success of the war. Without the heroics
of the airborne it is impossible to know what the outcome of D-Day or the war would
have been. Surely there were brave men in the other branches of the American military
and the militaries of all other nations but during the last twenty years the limelight has
solely rested upon the airborne. Perhaps the notion of jumping out of an airplane into
enemy territory with limited supplies and little to no chance of reinforcement in 1944
fulfilled the requirements set down by the American public to be truly mythologized.
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Chapter 3-Evolvling a Mission and a Myth
At its inception no one understood how the airborne would respond to a combat
situation. Problems with regrouping and equipment were evident throughout the largescale training jumps and the small-scale combat jumps. Even though the different
militaries understood these deficiencies they still failed to address the problem and
continued to plan the airborne’s part during the French invasion while using antiquated
tactics.

Through the inauguration of the American airborne a certain elite and

masculine image of the paratroopers immerged. This image helped the paratroopers
through their recruitment and combat efforts. While in combat this image propelled
the paratroopers to survive and succeed. However, through their training and attitude
their mission was clear. They went to Normandy to kill the enemy and they succeeded
with great efficiency.
The airborne operations that took place on D-Day and in World War Two in
general were never a forgone conclusion for the United States Military. The army
resembled something of the nineteenth century not of a world power that recently took
part in the First World War. After the millions of doughboys returned home from
Europe the United States retreated into its traditional isolationalist foreign policy. In
1940, the size of the American military was, in fact, only the size of two divisions and
was not at the state of readiness that most minor European nations kept their militaries.
Russell Weigley states, “In the early part of that year of the German Blitzkrieg, the
American army was antique enough. There were only two Regular divisions in the
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Continental United States that amounted to more than the barest of skeletons and
could be said to be reasonably ready for combat.”1 Typically the United States did not
maintain a large standing military and relied heavily on volunteers when the nation was
in need. In addition to that, half of the two divisions were horse cavalry. The Untied
States also kept the military small during the Great Depression to save money.2 Unlike
the more militarily modern nations of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, the
United States had yet to institute an armored division into its military. The American
military was in the process of testing and debating the use of new military tactics,
techniques, equipment and weapons.
In fact, like in the use of armored units, the United States lagged years behind
other nations throughout the world in their development of airborne combat infantry.
Nations such as the Soviet Union, Germany and Great Britain all developed airborne
troops while the United States still maintained an extremely small standing military. So
much so that historian Russell F. Weigley argued that it was not a military at all but
instead a police force set to control unruly Mexicans and Indians. Weigley writes:
“Historically, the American army was not an army in the European fashion, but a border
constabulary for policing unruly Indians and Mexicans. The United States Army of 1940
had not yet completed the transition that would make it an appropriate instrument of
its country’s claims to world power.”3
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While the United States was confronting border conflicts with post revolutionary
Mexico and a still unhappy Native American population other nations were conducting
large scale combat maneuvers. The Soviet Union and Germany conducted large scale
paradrops in their war games during the 1930’s. While the United States was just
beginning to show interest in airborne divisions, nations such as this had already tested
and implemented their airborne units. The largest was the Soviet Union’s paradrops on
Kiev in 1936. Rapport and Northwood write: “But during the 1930’s both the Russians
and the Germans carried out extensive experiments, and peacetime paratrooping
probably reached climax with the reported Russian use of five thousand paratroopers in
their maneuvers at Kiev in 1936.”4 Maneuvers such as this made it clear that airborne
troops would be used in the next large-scale confrontation. Although it was evident
that the United States was beginning to fall behind in military technology the President
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff required more convincing.
The concept of soldiers falling from the ski behind an enemy’s fortification has
been a part of civilization since the ages of Da Vinci, Machiavelli and even Benjamin
Franklin. Da Vinci sketched images of small gondolas fitted with sheets carrying men-atarms, and Benjamin Franklin once said, “Five thousand balloons capable of raising two
men each could not cost more than five ships of the line; and where is the prince who
could afford so to cover his country with troops for its defense as that ten thousand
men descending from the clouds might not in many places do an infinite deal of mischief
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before a force could be brought together to repel them.”5 Although Benjamin Franklin
was the first American to understand the benefits behind airborne troops, he was not
the one who brought the idea to fruition. During World War One, Brigadier General
William Mitchell conceived the idea that soldiers dropped from the sky could break the
stalemate caused by trench warfare. He was granted provisional approval and was
scheduled to apply the notion in November of 1918. However, another breakthrough in
technology would have the honor of cracking open trench warfare: the tank. General
Mitchell would have to wait another twenty-six years before he would be placed in
charge of another airborne company.
Mitchell became the biggest proponent for the use of combat aircraft as the
United States’ first line of defense. In addition to the use of airborne units he also
promoted the creation, implementation and use of aircraft carriers and a dedicated air
force. Since the end of the First World War, General Mitchell’s only goal was to
promote the use of airplanes in every aspect of the American military. Unfortunately
for him, the United States military was once again reduced after the end of the war. He
became such an annoyance for the military that he was court-martialed for
insubordination in 1928.
The creation of the airborne was a process that, although it went through its ups
and downs, was implemented extremely quickly.

By 1940 the American military

approved the formation of a parachute test platoon that would not only test the notion
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of a paratroop platoon but also the ability for the military to transport, arm and
successfully deploy this platoon into a combat zone. At its onset airborne divisions were
composed of volunteers. In the future these volunteers would come from every aspect
the United States military. They would come from the armored divisions, the tank
drivers; they would come from the infantry and the officers would come right out of
Officer Candidate School (OCS) or would be veterans of many years. Regardless of their
history the future paratroopers volunteered to be molded into the elite unit they would
later be known as.
However the United States did conduct small scale drops in Texas. Rapport and
Northwood write: “In 1928-1929 small-scale experiments in dropping parachutists and
weapons were conducted at Kelly and Brooks Fields, Texas.”6 Paradrops such as these
paled in comparison to their European counterparts and even the large Allied jumps
during World War Two. Not only were the designers of the American airborne aware of
the training that their European counterparts were receiving but they were also very
aware of their military and combat prowess.

David Kenyon Webster’s memoir,

Parachute Infantry, illustrates just how much the American airborne looked up to their
European counterparts. They were especially aware of the German Luftwaffe. Webster
quotes Colonel Robert Sink: “’Men,’ he said, wiping his face with his hand, ‘we’ve shown
you this picture because we wanted you to see how the Germans fight. ‘Did you watch
them closely? Did you see how fast they moved? How they used every bit of the
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available cover and concealment? Remember those things when you go into combat.’” 7
They comprised a few dozen paratroopers at most and often they jumped without any
equipment or small arms.

The European’s maneuvers included thousands of

paratroopers and these different nations dropped everything from small artillery pieces
to jeeps and armored personal carriers (APC’s). These small scale jumps would form the
foundation of the American airborne. Once approved to create a provisional paratroop
platoon Major Lee was forced to invent a way to properly train volunteers coming from
the infantry to successfully jump from a plane.
Lee was influenced from a variety of different methods including the small
American paradrops as well as those from Europe. Lee was even able to take methods
from the New York World’s Fair, the parachute towers, to help train the future airborne.
“Studying the parachute towers at the New York World’s Fair, he became convinced
that they would help his men master the art of jumping. So on July 29 the Test Platoon
was moved to Hightstown, New Jersey, for a week on the tower company’s home
grounds.”8 Later these towers would be built at the Airborne’s new home a Fort
Benning. These towers would provide the young troopers the intense feeling of an
arrested free fall before the necessary training jumps they would all be forced to
complete before receiving their jump wings. From here another founding father would
take control, and then Major William C. Lee.
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Lee, a rugged North Carolinian who fought in the infantry in World War I, was
given the task of creating and inventing the units that would come to epitomize the elite
nature of the airborne. The American military knew so little of the parachuting that Lee
had to find knowledge elsewhere. He ventured west and learned about precision
paradroping from the Forest Service and their smoke jumpers. “There was much to be
done. After extensive inquiries, Major Lee found that the U.S. Forest Service in the West
knew more about dropping men and equipment on a precise spot than any other group
in America, and he went out there to learn how they did it.”9 Between the advice the
Department of the Interior gave and the parachute towers coined for a world’s fair now
Lieutenant Colonel Lee was able to effectively train the airborne. The first jump
occurred on August 16, 1940 and it provided the foundation and regulations that led the
military to institute further jumps. However, more importantly was the fact that the
airborne had yet to receive a mission or an objective. The debate was still raging at all
levels and no one was quite sure how the airborne could be used in a combat zone.
However, in 1940 the military collectively came up with the airborne’s first mission
statement. “…the employment of parachute troops in hemisphere Defense to seize
Landing areas where only light opposition is expected, and to secure the areas for short
periods until reinforced by air infantry.”10 For many this directive seemed more of a
death sentence than an objective. To be drop in an area that was supposedly lightly
defended with little chance of reinforcement left little to be desired. It is clear that this
directive was changed numerous times before D-Day.
9
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The paratroopers had an interesting take on the objectives of their division.
From the beginning the airborne had a less than stellar reputation. In 1938 Camp
Toombs was created in Southern Georgia in order to train the Georgia National Guard.
It was named after General Robert Toombs, a general for the Confederacy during the
Civil War. Camp Toombs maintained little or no facilities until the War Department
decided to make the camp into the training facility for the paratroops shortly after
World War II began. In 1942 Colonel Robert F. Sink, commanding 506th PIR, thought it
was improper to have young troopers drive past a casket factory and learn to jump at
“Camp Tombs.” So he implored the War Department to rename the camp, Toccoa. The
camp was originally made to accommodate 20,000 men but at its maximum never held
more than two regiments at a time. Before leaving Toccoa, Colonel Sink, Commander
506th PIR read an article in Readers Digest about a 100 mile long march that the
Japanese Army had completed down the Malayan Peninsula in seventy-two hours.
Immediately following he decided that a 118 mile march was to be completed by
Colonel Strayer’s 2nd Battalion. In the end they covered 118 miles in seventy-five
hours.11 Although the paratroopers had a rather gloomy take on their position in the
military but they were able to overcome it and use to their advantage.

The

paratroopers believed they had nothing to lose and therefore had everything to gain
with hard training, extensive knowledge and epic endurance and courage.
By November of 1942 the men of the 101st Division moved to Fort Benning
Georgia in order to complete parachute jump training. At this time, states Donald R.
11
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Burgett in his book Currahee! A Screaming Eagle at Normandy, the young paratroopers
learned what was called the Trooper’s Song, “Blood Upon the Risers,” set to the “Battle
Hymn of the Republic:
“Is everybody happy?” Cried the Sergeant, looking
up.
Our hero feebly answered “yes,” and then they
stood him up.
He leaped right out into the blast, his static line
unhooked.
He ain’t gonna jump no more.
(Chorus)
He counted long, he counted loud, he waited for
the shock;
He felt the wind, he felt the clouds, he felt the
awful drop;
He jerked his cord, the silk spilled out and
wrapped around his legs.
He ain’t gonna jump no more.
(Chorus)
The risers wrapped around his neck, connectors
cracked his dome;
The lines were snarled and tied in knots, around
his skinny bones;
The canopy became his shroud, he hurtled to the
ground.
He ain’t gonna jump no more.
(Chorus)
The days he’d lived and loved and laughed kept
running through his mind;
He thought about the girl back home, the one he’d
left behind;
He thought about the medics and wondered what
they’d find.
He ain’t gonna jump no more.
(Chorus)
The ambulance was on the spot, the jeeps were
running wild;
The medics jumped and screamed with glee, they
rolled their sleeves and smiled;
For it had been a week or more since last a chute
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had failed.
He ain’t gonna jump no more.
(Chorus)
He hit the ground, the sound was splat, his blood
went spurting high;
His comrades then were heard to say, “A helluva
way to die”;
He lay there rolling ‘round in the welter of his
gore.
He ain’t gonna jump no more.
(Chorus)
There was blood upon the risers, there were brains
upon the chute;
Intestines were a-dangling from this paratrooper’s
boots;
They picked him up, still in his chute and poured
him from his boots.
He ain’t gonna jump no more.
(Chorus)
CHORUS
Gory, Gory, What a Helluva way to die
Gory, Gory, What a Helluva way to die
Gory, Gory, What a Helluva way to die
He ain’t gonna jump no more.12
As morbid as this song may sound, it provides an interesting window into the
way paratroopers felt about their duty. The dangers of parachuting are much the same
as they are today. There are very few situations that cause the paratrooper to use his
reserve chute and even fewer fatalities.

However, even keeping in mind these

insecurities, the men were still able to joke about the dangers to cover their insecurities.
Parachuting from a plane at 1000 feet in 1944 was still a relatively dangerous endeavor.
Koskimaki describes one particular terrifying incident:
They bounced a couple of feet in the air. I couldn’t get over the fact that they
bounced; somehow it never occurred to me that a human body would do that.
12
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One of the sergeants leaped from a jeep and worked over the bodies a few
minutes, then got back in and drove up to us. Climbing out of the jeep he held
two pairs of bloodied jump boots from those two men out there.13

Even though the image of the death of these two paratroopers stayed with Koskimaki it
is evident that the event was turned into a learning experience and something that was
little more than ordinary. They were comfortable enough with the risks and dangers to
continue participating in the airborne.
Along with the debate and confusion inherent within the creation of the
airborne the military and public were unsure as to what the mission of an airborne
division would be. Many assumed that the elite image of the airborne would require
the divisions to be quite larger than that of a regular infantry division. However, in
reality a regular airborne division would, in fact, be quite a bit smaller than that of their
infantry counterparts. Koskimaki writes: “It was always easy for the casual observer to
believe that an airborne division, simply because it was airborne, was more capable in
every way than an ordinary division. Such misunderstanding dates from the very first
announcements, as when the Alexandria Town Talk said in the previously quoted article,
‘The new divisions will have about 8000 officers and men. The fire power, relatively
speaking, will be far greater than it is off the infantry type.’”14 However ambiguous the
establishment of the airborne was the problems that existed in the beginning continued
to persist until the end of the war and were inherent to the nature of airborne
operations.
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Paratroopers continued to be misdropped and because they were so ill supplied
it contributed to their poor communications once on the ground. All of the European
nations that maintained airborne units had similar troubles in their programs. Most
evident of this fact was the German Fallschirmjäger in Crete in 1941. Although the
operation was an overall success the German Army and the Fallschirmjäger had several
large miscalculations and because of those miscalculations they would never operate
another large-scale combat jump for the rest of the war. Later, after World War Two
began the United States would have its own similar difficulties with airborne operations
in Africa and in Sicily. James A. Huston illustrates the difficulties seen within the
Fallschirmjäger’s jump into Crete: “The first American airborne operations in North
Africa and in Sicily were disappointing.

Scattered drops and lack of coordination

indicated a need for more training than had been available. Paratroopers dropped as
far as fifty and sixty miles in Sicily, and few hit the drop zones which had been
selected.”15 Although these issues appear to be rather serious, the airborne operations
in North Africa and Sicily were considered to help in the overall success of the operation.
These are just a few of the serious implications and repercussions that the
United States military learned after their first airborne experience. The night after the
first drop in Sicily, airborne reinforcements were dropped to reinforce the paratroopers
already on the ground.16

Huston writes: “the most unfortunate incident of that

operation was the following night when friendly ground and naval units fired on
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transport planes brining in airborne reinforcements.”17 From then on the United States
commanders coordinated with the navy and army when conducting airborne operations
to prohibit friendly fire. In some cases, however, it could not be avoided to due to the
lack of communication between the pilots themselves and the gun crews on land and
sea nervously awaiting the Nazi horde that was just beyond the horizon.
The problems General Lee discovered while researching the formation of the
airborne were still evident on June 6, 1944: scattered drops, poor communications and
chaos. The only difference in 1944 was that the drop was made at night, the C-47
Dakotas took heavy anti-aircraft fire and the pilots of the Dakotas were forced, by fear
or fire, to “green light”18 the jump too low and too fast. Webster writes: “That goddamn
Air Corps. I reached up, grasped all four risers, and yanked down hard, to fill the canopy
with air and slow my descent. Just before I hit, I closed my eyes and took a deep breath
of air. My feet splashed into the water.”19 For paratroopers, the jump itself was the
most traumatic experience of D-Day. Many C-47’s, receiving heavy fire from German
anti-aircraft guns, took evasive maneuvers and increased and decreased speed and
altitude in order to avoid mid air collisions. Often pilots switched the jump light from
red to green simply to empty their cargo and return to England without taking anymore
fire from the ground. Shortly after D-Day, the Army Air Corps received much of the
blame and criticism for the misdrops all over Normandy.
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Throughout the last sixty-seven years the pilots transporting the airborne on DDay have received more than their fair share of criticism.

Criticisms have arisen

surrounding the training, composure, intelligence and even bravery of the pilots. It was
argued that because the pilots were not as well trained or well perceived by the public.
Their low stature as transport pilots opened them up for criticism by those who believed
that the more prestigious roles of bomber of fighter pilots were given to a more
courageous and honorable lot. Koskimaki makes a note of the bad connotation that the
C-47 pilots had when he quotes Sergeant Chester Pentz’s experience on the flight to
Normandy. “Our pilot veered off course when he encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire.”
Pentz remarked, “As you may know, quite a few pilots got ‘buck fever’ when we
approached the drop zones.”20 Although the anti-aircraft fire was intense and the cloud
bank that lingered right before the majority of the drop zones would have been
troublesome for any veteran pilot it should have been made clear to the pilots that to
veer off course could mean death and ultimate failure for their occupants. Another
example of the chaos caused by pilots who were not trained to fly in a combat zone is
seen through the memories of Captain William J. Waldmann Koskimaki illustrates: “We
were preparing to jump when the plane suddenly speeded up (due to stacking up, as we
were told later by the pilot), throwing us to the back of the plane. We jumped at high
speed while the pilot was trying to return to the drop zone.”21 The pilots of the Dakota’s
appear to be at fault for much of the problems that engulfed and surrounded the
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airborne. However as previous airborne operations have shown, these troubles are
inherent in the use of airborne troops behind enemy lines.
Throughout its inception with the Italians, its use in the maneuvers in Kiev, the
Fallschirmjäger in Crete and eventually the Americans on D-Day, the airborne has
experienced significant problems with the accuracy of its drops and the airborne’s
ability to regroup after landing. Once again, as the German Fallschirmjäger reached its
climax as an operational force, Allied armies were just beginning to take shape. They
became so bold that they decided to attempt an airborne invasion of the island of Crete,
over the defending British Mediterranean Navy. John Keegan writes, “As German
parachute formations grew in numbers and confidence, so that in April 1941 they could
assault and take the island of Crete over the heads of an impotent Royal Navy, the first
experimental airborne units had begun to take shape in the Allied armies.”22 According
to historian, John Keegan the German paradrops in Crete illustrated successes and
failures of airborne operations against an enemy combatant. In the air the German
Luftwaffe took heavy anti-aircraft fire that forced the pilots to misdrop the airborne.
Once they landed the German Fallschirmjäger was disorganized and unable to regroup
to attack en mass. They were separated and attacked by British and Commonwealth
troops who were able to locate the confused paratroopers before they could rearm and
regroup. He writes: “The minority of troops which actually fought kept together as best
they could; those who had left Greece organized now lost all semblance of unity. ‘Never
shall I forget the disorganization and almost complete lack of control of the masses on
22
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the move.’”23 Major General Bernard Freyburg later said regarding the hasty retreat his
men were forced to make. After the embarrassing endeavor in Crete and the same
results in Holland the German army would never again attempt airborne operations. All
in all the German Fallschirmjäger suffered much the same problems and confusion that
allied units would see during their own operations.
The Allied armies failed to glean the failure of the airborne from their German
counterparts. Even Hitler himself deemed the Fallschirmjäger too dangerous of an
endeavor. Keegan writes: “Hitler’s appreciation of Operation Merkur was correct:
parachuting to war is essentially a dicing with death, in which the odds are loaded
against the soldier who entrusts his life to silk and static line.”24 Instead the Allied
commanders took different point of view regarding the successes and failures of the
German airborne operations. They argued that the German implementation of the
airborne was the problem and not that there was a problem with the concept of the
airborne in general. Once again, Keegan writes: “The British and Americans, both
energetically raising parachute divisions, drew from Crete a conclusion different from
Hitler’s: that it was the particular form rather than the underlying principle of airborne
operations which had proved unsound.”25 Little did the Allied commanders know but
the problems that the Fallschirmjäger ran into were inherent to the airborne and not
simply a misuse of the doctrine. It could be argued that one of the reasons behind the
mass confusion and disruption in reorganization that allied airborne units had once on
23
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the ground in France was caused by the lack of credible intelligence about the ground
around the landing zones.
The organization of the airborne caused confusion and speculation throughout
the military, airborne and general public. Even the paratroopers themselves had trouble
understanding the mission of the airborne as a divisional unit in a large army. Its size
was always a large subject of debate. Even the paratroopers themselves assumed they
would appear to be a modified infantry regiment.

Dr. Lewis remembers: “Now,

originally the 82nd was just a line outfit. Sergeant York’s old outfit, if you remember.
And now the Infantry Division, Land Division, is a larger division than the Airborne
Division. The airborne is smaller, small and mobile.”26 It is important to note that the
size of the two American Airborne Divisions was not for lack of public or military support
or even lack of volunteers but was intended to create a small extremely mobile force
that was able to respond quickly to enemy threats. In addition, the units that comprised
the division were smaller than that of a regular triangular division.27 A triangular
division is a designation given to the way divisions are organized. In a triangular
organization, the division's main body is composed of three regimental maneuver
elements. Marshall Brucer edited a collection of histories from the airborne in The
History of the Airborne Command and in it he details the unit sizes for the airborne and
that of a standard infantry division. “The parachute and glider infantry regiments had
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strength of 1958 and 1605 respectively, in contrast to the 3000 of the standard infantry
regiment. All service units were smaller than those of the standard infantry division.”28
The airborne units were supposed to land in wide open, dry plains that were
clear of enemy forces as possible. After the Allied air forces defeated the German
Luftwaffe and gained air superiority, they began to run large-scale intelligence
operations over the proposed landing zones. Small planes with fighter escorts flew over
the area and took scores of aerial photographs. Allied intelligence prided itself on the
accuracy of its information. Code breaking operations like ULTRA provided the allies
with an unprecedented amount of information about their enemy’s movements.
However, for whatever reasons, the intelligence on the landing zones and antiaircraft
capabilities of the German’s in Normandy were underdeveloped or deficient. Ruggero
writes: “Within minutes the German assault intensified, with the attackers dropping
mortar rounds on the American roadblock. The little crossroads was full of flying
shrapnel, which kept the GIs from moving about and adjusting their defensive positions
to meet the new threats. The paratroopers were pinned in place by the accurate fire,
while the enemy, mostly out of sight, pressed closer.”29
However many of these photographs did not capture the booby traps that the
German’s had laid out in case of airborne assault. The Germans did not know where the
invasion of France would be but they did know that it was going to happen. In order to
prevent an invasion of Europe Hitler ordered one of his top commanders, Field Marshall
28
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Erwin Rommel, to construct a defensive line across the beaches and flood the lowlands
of northern France to prevent any possible allied invasion. The airborne defenses
consisted of barbed wire, land mines, spiked wooden pillars and artillery shells wired to
explode on contact. General Gavin describes the Rommelspargel in his memoir On to
Berlin: “The entire hill was covered with Rommelspargel. They were all wired together
with barbed wire, some from top to top, others from top of one pole to the bottom of
an opposite pole, and others from the bottom of one to the bottom of another.” Gavin
continues, “They were booby-trapped to artillery shells and some of them to mines.”30
Unfortunately for Rommel and his Ost Battalions, German Army recruits from the
conquered countries of Poland, Lithuania and occupied Russia, were far too few to
construct them in all of the possible dropzones. Keegan describes these units:
Moreover, several of the German battalions were not German at all in
composition, but manned by more-or-less willing volunteers from the army of
prisoners whom the Germans had taken in the east during 1941-42. They were
indeed known as East (Ost) Battalion, for to have called them Russian would
have been inaccurate. They represented for the most part the peripheral and
unassimilated peoples of the Russian empire, Cossacks, Georgians, Turkomen,
Armenians, Volga Tartars, and Azerbaijanis, who had swapped a tenuous sense
of citizenship for the guarantee of regular meals, and might be expected to
waver in their new loyalty if pressed to fight for their suppers.31
Because the troops defending the “Atlantic Wall” were not frontline German soldiers it
is argued that the airborne caught a good break. However, the Panzer Divisions ordered
to respond to any conflict were veteran Eastern Front troops. These were just a few of
the lethal obstacles placed in dropzones for the paratroopers to deal with. Luckily, few
of the paratroopers encountered such defensive positions due to the miss drop.
30
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Along the beaches Rommel constructed a defensive line that consisted of
landmines, tank traps and machinegun nests that he called the “Atlantic Wall.” To
defend against airborne landings, he constructed machinegun nests facing any open
area large enough for paratroopers to land.

In addition he flooded32 the entire

Normandy lowlands and constructed sharpened spikes entwined with barbed wire to
eviscerate paratroopers as they landed.

German troops called them “Rommel’s

Asparagus.” Historian and journalist Max Hastings, a former German Soldier, explains in
Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy: “The soldiers did as little work as possible
and we were too busy putting up wire and planting Rommel’s Asparagus to have much
time for training.”33 The machinegun nests and “Rommel’s Asparagus” would prove to
be deadly, but the misdrops by the Army Air Corps helped save the paratroopers
because few landed in the marked dropzones.
Allied military intelligence took pride in their ability to map out the Norman
countryside and collect the large volume of intelligence that they had on Nazi
emplacements, troops and the dropzones. Regardless of what they thought they knew
about the dropzones and the status of the enemy they failed to detect or see flooded
dropzones, landing-zone booby traps, armored divisions and enemy strength.

All of

which the airborne units did not expect to encounter. The flooded dropzones caused
the most trouble for the paratroopers as they landed. The men were not prepared to
land in the water, which came as a fierce shock when they landed and almost
32
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immediately began to sink and drown. At least thirty-six paratroopers drowned due to
the flooded low lands. The water from the Douve and Merderet Rivers inundated the
entire area and caused a terrifying experience for most of the paratroopers in some way
or another. In his memoir Ed Ruggero, a paratrooper in the 82nd Airborne Division,
recalls the terrifying experience of one of his companions who landed in the water:
“Scores of troopers landed in the flooded Merderet plain. Instead of collapsing, his
chute went into the river, caught the current, and started pulling him along, face-down,
overloaded with heavy equipment, and helpless.”34 The military always assumed that
the more equipment that the paratroopers could carry the better off they would be in
the field and the longer they could live without being reinforced. Unfortunately for
many, the Allied commanders had no idea that the entire proposed landing zone was
flooded.
The amount of equipment that paratroopers carried during D-Day made a
powerful arsenal and flush footlockers and pantries.

Everything from three-days

rations, weapons, ammunition, clothing and explosives were attached to the
paratroopers as they jumped from the Dakotas. In addition, if a paratrooper was a part
of a weapon’s team, mortar or machinegun team he also carried ammunition and parts
for that system. Airborne historian Crookenden writes:
Impregnated, combinations vest and long drawers were issued to each man, but
they were so stiff and scratchy to wear that most threw them away as soon as
they had a chance to take their clothes off. The combat jacket and trousers were
sensible, shower-proof and comfortable, and in the baggy pockets of the jacket
34
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and trousers a pocket knife, spoon, razor, socks, cleaning patches, torch, maps,
rations and ammunition were carried. Each man had three days of K ration, a
compact three-meal package of food alleged to be scientifically nourishing, but
universally disliked by the Army (the best food of the war for the 82 nd, in the
soldier’s view, was the British “Compo” 14-man ration issued to them in Holland
during the Nijmegen battles), Each man also carried an emergency “D” ration of
chocolate, a compass, two fragmentation grenades, one Hawkins anti-tank mine,
one smoke grenade and a Gammon bomb.35
Often the weight carried by the paratroopers equaled their own body weight. Ironically
most airborne troops lost the majority of their equipment when they jumped. Most
paratroopers landed only with a jump knife and perhaps their carbine or Thompson.
Later on June 5, 1944, a historic image showed a young lieutenant pushing one of his
comrades into the C-47 because he could not get up the steep ladder by himself. Major
Winters describes how he took pride in helping each one of the men in his stick climb
the ladder. He writes: “In fact, like others in the stick, I had to push him up the steps
into the plane because he carried such a heavy load.”36 Others, officers included, found
the extra load to be an unbearable burden and shed all spare equipment. Between the
flooded low lands, booby-traps and the Ost Battalions and the inherent dangers jumping
out of a plane paratroopers were lucky to survive. After D-Day the American public and
the military created a myth that would shroud the airborne in danger, adventure and
glory.
Historians and former paratroopers alike have written or commented on the
image of the airborne. Draftees saw the shiny black shoes and the baggy pants and
were immediately intrigued by the differences between the airborne and the other
35
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branches of the American military.

Ben Molinaro remembers the mystery that

surrounded the airborne even as the war waged. After the Battle of the Bulge and the
101st airborne’s heroism at Bastogne that division earned the nickname “The Battered
Bastards of Bastogne.”37 Molinaro remembers, “But Hitler called us killers with baggy
pants.”38 The legend or reputation of the airborne was recognized throughout the U.S.
military. However when the airborne recruited its first class of paratroopers, there was
no long history or tradition and no combat record to entice volunteers. At first glance,
few would be willing to join the airborne, the idea of jumping out a plane daunted many
but the airborne seemed the manliest of outfits and the prestige of the airborne
emanated swelled its ranks.
During the early days of the airborne, for example when paratroopers tried to
encourage young draftees to join the airborne, the paratroopers epitomized super
masculine roles. George Mosse’s monograph on masculinity The Image of Man: The
Creation of Modern Masculinity examines how paratroopers presented the airborne as a
group of ubber masculine superman. Joanna Bourke, a historian at the University of
London, writes about how modern masculine theory is based upon the super masculine
body image. She writes, “This is the chief difference between modern masculinity and
what went before: the modern stereotype emphasizes the body.” 39 The early image of
the airborne was full of Mosse’s stereotypical masculine image. They were portrayed,
37

George E. Koskimaki, The Battered Bastards of Bastogne: A Chronicle of the Defense of Bastogne,
December 19, 1944-January 17, 1945 (New York: Casemate Publishing, 2003).
38
Benjamin Molinaro. Benjamin Molinaro Collection, 08/06/2005. Veterans History Project, American
Folklife Center, Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/bib/32334, 28.
39
Joanna Bourke, “Review of The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity,” Reviews in History
15, no. 23 (1997).

64

stereotypically as gun toting macho men who accomplished their goals because of their
gender. This is important because, as Mosse states, stereotypes help to formulate a
person’s judgments or memories. Mosse explains these:
Modern masculinity was a stereotype, presenting a standardized mental picture,
‘the unchanging representation of another,’ as Webster’s Dictionary defines
stereotypes. Such a picture must be coherent in order to be effective, and in
turn, the internalized visual image, the mental picture, relies upon the
perception of outward appearance in order to judge a person’s worth.
Stereotypes objectify human nature, making it easy to understand at a glance
and to pass judgment.40
The airborne’s stereotypical images of men and the paratroopers, as masculine, helped
to create the image of the airborne. The masculine images that the paratroopers
typified allured young men to join.
Young men all over the United States were drawn to the manly image these boys
strove to emulate. Dr. Lewis recalls: “They were sharp looking fellows, had Class A
uniforms, wings, shiny boots, their pants tucked in their boots, and they asked for
volunteers, and some of us volunteered. I thought I could do that. Those boys stood
there and looked proud and liked what they were doing, and they convinced me, and I
volunteered.”41 Dr. Lewis is not the only young volunteer who was encouraged by the
look and prestige of the airborne. Sergeant Donald Malarkey, made famous by the HBO
miniseries Band of Brothers, wrote his own memoir and commented on why the
airborne was a perfect fit for him. He writes: “I wanted to be one of the hardest,
toughest, and best-dressed soldiers in the army. I wanted to be ‘hardened into a

40
41

George L. Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (Oxford, 1998), 6.
Lewis, Veterans History Project, 1.

65

physical superman.’ Wear those wings. Hell I wanted to jump out of an airplane with a
parachute on my back and be ‘cocky.’ It seemed challenging, yet simple: go on a
mission for few days, fight like hell, get picked up, and return to your post.” 42 For many
the look of the paratroopers and the status of the airborne was more than enough for
them to want to join. However the future and success of the airborne was handy
guaranteed. The paratroopers themselves would have to prove their worth in combat
for themselves and in the eyes of their commanders, the Allied command staff and the
public in general.
As soon as the paratroopers landed in Northern France they began to take on a
larger than life persona. The image of thousands of combat ready soldiers falling from
the night sky while illuminated by enemy anti-aircraft fire provided an almost mythical
illustration of marital prowess. Even the French citizenry who were awakened in the
middle of the night by the enormous crackle and bang of Nazi anti-aircraft were
mesmerized by the sights of the airborne that night. Ryan describes a scene: “The
planes came in fast and low, accompanied by a thunderous barrage of antiaircraft fire,
and she [a French farmer] was momentarily deafened by the din. Almost immediately
the roar of the engines faded, the firing ceased and, as though nothing had happened,
there was silence again. It was then that she heard a strange fluttering sound from
somewhere above her. She looked up. Floating down, heading straight for the garden,
was a parachute with something bulky swinging beneath it.”43 Thousands of French
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citizens had similarly startling experiences with paratroopers. They remembered the
faces of the young men who fell from the sky as their liberators.

The singular

paratrooper floating through the darkness illuminated by enemy fire to fight in a foreign
land coalesced into the iconic image that the airborne wanted and needed and that the
public eagerly consumed.
Although most of the paratroopers argue that their intention was not to be the
next “Sergeant York” but to merely accomplish their mission and go home, the airborne
was responsible for some of the most heroic actions among Allied forces on D-Day. One
such example was when a young paratrooper from the 82nd dropped into an occupied
French city. At once the commandant recognized the young man as an American
paratrooper and offered him the keys to the city. In Those Devils in Baggy Pants former
82nd airborne paratrooper Ross S. Carter remembers: “Inside an impeccable old gent
looking like a four-star general in a comic opera uniform stepped up, snapped to
attention, gave me a tailor-made salute and spouted a bunch of formalities in the Ginnie
language. I gravely returned the salute, and then asked my interpreter what the hell
he’d said. He replied that the fancy dude was the commandant of the city, was turning
it over to me and wanted to know what I was going to do.”44 Although this is one of the
more comical situations that a paratrooper had to deal with on June 6, it still represents
the kinds of actions paratroopers dealt with. Unfortunately for others they were not as
lucky.
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Most of the paratroopers were thrust into combat immediately upon landing in
France. With or without weapons the paratroopers were forced to fight for their lives
when they hit the ground. Rapport and Northwood write, “Or even [were] shot dead
before they did so.”45 Unfortunately, the bulky leg bags, torn away by the jump, left
many without their weapons. Without their rifles and equipment the paratroopers
were virtually defenseless. The dropped placed others in precocious situations. Ryan
describes paratrooper PFC John Steele hanging by a bell tower, shot in the foot and
forced to watch the slaughter of the other members of his stick.
Almost as soon as he left his plane, Private John Steele of the 82 nd’s 505th
Regiment saw that instead of landing in a lighted drop zone he was heading for
the center of a town that seemed to be on fire. Then he saw German soldiers
and French civilians running frantically about. Most of them, it seemed to
Steele, were looking up at him. The next moment he was hit by something that
felt ‘like the bite of a sharp knife.’ A bullet had smashed into his foot. Then
Steele saw something that alarmed him even more. Swinging in his harness,
unable to veer away from the town, he dangled helplessly as his chute carried
him straight toward the church steeple at the edge of the square.46
Images such as these, however terrifying, helped to weave the myth that soon
enhanced the airborne’s reputation.

Their selfless sacrifice in hopeless situations

symbolized the American can-do spirit.

The average American understood that

sacrifices, like those made by the paratroopers at Sainte-Mère-Église, was what was
needed to win the war. And paratroopers went above and beyond the duty to that of
the average soldier destroy targets and capture critical towns, roads, and other points.
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Combat and war had created heroes in the United States. World War Two was
no different. Rapport and Northwood describe a legendary 101st Airborne Division
assault on a fortified German position:

Past the mess hall was a two-story barracks. Summers, Camien and the others
tried to attack; it resulted in four dead and four wounded paratroopers and
building still stood. Private Burt then fired tracers into a haystack next to the
building and started a fire which spread to a nearby ammunition shed. As the
stuff began to explode Germans came pouring out of the shed. They were shot
down-about thirty of them-as they tried to dash across the open space to the
barracks or the field beyond. Just then S/Sgt. Roy Nickrent of Headquarters
Company, 1st Battalion, arrived with a bazooka. He put seven rounds into the
building, the last one setting fire to the upper story. The remaining Germans,
about a hundred-made a dash from the building.47
A hand full of determined young paratroopers took on an entire barracks of wellarmed, well-defended Germans and succeeded in destroying the strong point.
Successes like these helped build American and military support for the airborne.
Not all paratroopers charged headlong into combat that night. Some were
stricken ill by the air sickness pills given to the paratroopers right before they entered
the Dakota’s for the invasion. The air sickness pills, originally designed to avoid any
motion sickness caused by turbulence or anti-aircraft fire, had the undesirable side
affect of drowsiness. Paratroopers already exhausted physically and emotionally from
months of training and anticipation could not resist the drug’s affects and fell asleep in
air or on the ground once they landed. “PFC George Doxzen had taken two anti-motion
sickness pills and slept during the entire trip. The others had to wake him up for the
jump preparations. After an uneventful drop, he had gotten together with four or five
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others, including his squad leader. He said, ‘I met up with Holbrook, Hatch Zettwich,
and a few others. Hatch put me on outpost duty and I immediately fell asleep. The
outfit moved while I slept. It was those damned pills!’”48 One of the biggest blunders of
the Allied D-Day assault, the last minute addition of the anti-motion sickness pills to the
paratroopers, caused many to fall asleep or lose their “edge.” Others, terrified, tired or
overcome by adrenaline, were struck down by exhaustion and lingered for hours by
themselves under cover. Others still simply tried to survive the night and try and
regroup in the morning. Burgett remembers: “The four of us decided to find a place
where we could defend ourselves and rest until daybreak, when we would stand a
better chance of finding friendly troops without running into an army of enemy.”49
Staying in a well defended position until day break, however, was counterproductive to
the mission objectives. The goal of the airborne was to achieve complete and utter
surprise and to execute their combat missions in time for the beginning of the Allied
invasion at the beachheads.

The airborne objectives were by no means trivial. Allied commanding general
Eisenhower even claimed that without the airborne D-Day would have failed.50 The
objectives given to the airborne were not only critical for the invasion of Normandy on
D-Day but also for the Allied efforts in the future, particularly to move toward
Cherbourg, the only deep-water port in the area, and eventually to retake Paris and the
rest of occupied France. According to Ambrose, Eisenhower gave the airborne the “task
48
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of seizing the raised roads that crossed the flooded areas, so that the seaborne assault
troops could use the roads to move inland,”51 and thus to free up space on the beaches,
relieve cut off airborne units or engage enemy armor and infantry units defending the
hedgerows throughout northern France. The hedgerows in Normandy would go down
in history as the biggest difficulty the Allies had to overcome after the invasion of
France.

Historian David Irving would describe these earthen breastworks: “These

hedges were to prove a serious impediment. Mud walls thrown up between the
patchwork fields, matted with the roots of saplings cut back from time to time for
firewood, the hedgerows were almost impassable even for the Allied tanks.” 52 These
hedgerows were significant obstruction for the paratroopers, making it very difficult for
those trying to regroup and to locate where other paratroopers were.

These natural earthen barriers were fortified by the Nazi’s with barbed wire,
machinegun nests and breastworks for infantry to cover behind.

The labyrinth

composed of wood, root and earth caused the paratroopers to be disoriented. Because
of the confusion caused by the maze of hedgerows the paratroopers were almost
always prevented from completing their objectives.

According to Webster their

objectives were to “’take the two causeways, Exits One and Two, here. The Germans
may flood the low ground behind the beach and confine the infantry to these causeways
so they are A Number One on our list of objectives. They have to be taken and held.
Those gun batteries I just mentioned have to be wiped out.
51

If they’re not fully

Ibid., 76.
David Irving, The War Between the Generals: Inside the Allied High Command (New York: Congdon &
Lattes, Inc., 1981), 163.
52

71

destroyed we may be all alone in Normandy, because they can stop the infantry right in
the water.’”53

Because the airborne lost the element of surprise after hours of

wondering throughout the hedgerows of Northern France the enemy was able to retake
objective lost and contest those that being fought over. The enemy’s superiority in
numbers, equipment, ammunition and armor allowed them to quickly and strongly
reinforce contested areas. The Nazi’s superior armament and numbers allowed them to
easily retake the positions that were loosely held by the airborne. Marshall writes: “The
pile-up of German armor was in juxtaposition to the wreckage from the earlier fight
threw a barrier (or shield) of metal broadwise of the causeway and the enemy infantry
sprang to make best use of it. Thereby the two sides became locked in a sudden death
grapple at 35 yards’ range, the Germans behind steel, the Americans partly helped by
dirt banks.”54

In some cases the airborne lost their conventional battles but, on occasion, the
airborne was able to hold out under extraordinary circumstances until infantry units,
usually from the 4th Infantry Division, rising from the beachheads could reinforce them.
These were the battles that truly helped to create the myth of the airborne. The
airborne seemed predisposed toward battles in which the odds were against them.55

In some cases the element of surprise did work in the favor of the airborne and
the Allied armies. The Ost battalions were hocked at being attacked in the dark, leading
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some to waver and retreat. The airborne trained the paratroopers to kill and to do so
quickly and quietly. Sergeant Bill Guarnere explains that the airborne made sure to
weed out any men who were not prepared to kill: “So it was kill or be killed. The Army
was training us to be killers. If you didn’t like the training, hit the pike. We didn’t want
any goldbricks or sissies next to us in combat.”56 In several different situations a few
paratroopers tricked the German army into believing that their numbers were larger,
causing them to retreat. Marshall describes one such situation: “the Germans, foxholed
in the orchards or firing from inside the farm buildings, refused to give way. On the left
of the road, Able Company was confronted by open fields. The presence of the tanks in
column prevented any German displacement to the roadway to get on Able’s flank. So
the armor and the one rifle company rolled right along together in to Beaumont,
capturing it at high noon. When the Americans gained the road intersection, the
resistance in front of Baker Company dissolved, and its people came abreast near the
village.”57

Extreme circumstances such as the combat the paratroopers faced on D-Day
brought them together even closer than the rigorous physical training they went
through. The airborne always seemed to be in the thick of it. The incessant combat that
the airborne was thrown into forced the paratroopers to develop an unwavering trust in
each other. More often than not a paratrooper’s first combat experience was a shock.
In an interview with Edward Michael Suita by Madeline Chavara, she asked him about
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his baptism by fire. “I remember in France, the first night I hit France on Hedgerow. I’m
watching guard and I think bats are flying around you know. You know the sound of a
bird that flies by ya. That’s what I heard. Shakin’ it off, I get up the next morning after I
get through with guard I went back fell asleep the next morning I’m telling these G.I.’s
there must be a lot of bats around here. They said they’re not bats, they’re air shrapnel,
you know. You learn from that.”58 The young paratrooper’s ignorance would not last
much longer than their first battle experience. A few would even go as far as to risk
their own lives on D-Day, simply because, at the time, they did not realize the risks they
were taking. Ambrose describes one such circumstance with Sergeant Carwood Lipton:
“Lipton decided to climb a tree, but there were none of sufficient size to allow him to
fire from behind a trunk. The one he picked had many small branches; he had to sit
precariously on the front side, facing the Germans, exposed if they looked his way,
balancing on several branches.”59 Risk taking, such as the Sergeant Lipton’s on D-Day,
happened less and less as the war went on and as the paratroopers became more
familiar with combat but battles such as Brecourt Manner, Bastogne and Nijmegen all
led to the creation of the image that surrounded the combat prowess of the airborne.60

Unfortunately for the airborne the casualties for D-Day were very high. Even
after D-Day the casualty rate for the airborne was almost always higher than that of
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their counterparts in the regular infantry.61 The airborne was also one of the few
branches of the military that even required its replacements to volunteer; it became
very difficult for the airborne to replenish its ranks after combat.
remembers: “They were asking for volunteers.

Norman Stieg

The parachute regiments were

volunteers because you didn’t get assigned, you had to volunteer…They needed so
many replacement men because of the casualties.”62

With the invasion, the paratroopers had to start dealing with the death that
surrounded them. If a paratrooper took the time to acknowledge its significance he
would fall apart in a matter of days. Bill Guarnere explains the need for a paratrooper
to keep death at arm’s length: “Wrong place, wrong time. You thank God it’s not you,
and you wonder if you’re next, but you don’t have time to think about it. You learn real
fast about war. Men drop dead right in front of you, and you better keep moving. You
don’t get used to it, believe me. But it’s war kid. You can’t be affected, or you’re dead.
Later, when you’re alone with your thoughts, you can think back to all the men you lost,
and then it hits you.”63 Airborne would be accustomed to the sights, sounds and smell
of death from jump training to combat in England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany and Austria, death was a constant reminder of their mortality and purpose.64
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From the beginning of Allied operation in Europe, critics discussed what the
airborne did or did not do on D-Day. Noted military historian Marshall was present in
Normandy after D-Day and one of the airborne’s biggest critics: “Elsewhere, except for a
few isolated and immobilized groups which were simply awaiting rescue, the American
forces had failed and the enemy was in solid possession of the countryside.”65 Not until
recent history have the airborne’s actions on D-Day been praised. Perhaps modern
military tactics and methods have illuminated the airborne’s effectiveness. For many in
the airborne the main objective, the key to success, was the ability to regroup.
Lieutenant Compton writes: “We absolutely couldn’t be scattered when we hit the
ground. Our whole point was to jump as a unit, ready to fight. We were soldiers first,
before we were parachutists.”66 Unfortunately the paratroopers were not dropped as
one cohesive unit and groups of one, two and three wandered the Norman coast
searching for enemy placements and targets of opportunity.

On D-Day, the objectives and tactics of the airborne quickly changed from largescale operations to small ones. Although those objectives were still critical to the D-Day
invasion, the search-and-destroy guerilla tactics that were used foreshadowed future
combat. These tactics caused the German Army more trouble than their original
objectives would have. Keegan writes: “The scattering of the American parachutists was
thought a calamity at the time, most of all by their tidy-minded commanders. In
retrospect it can be seen materially to have added to the confusion and disorientation
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the invasion was inflicting on their German opposite numbers.”67 It was years before
the true effectiveness of the airborne was understood. At the time the only measure of
success was the completion of the aforementioned objectives and because they failed
to accomplish them they were deemed a failure. Small groups of paratroopers were
more than capable of forming units of two or three and attacking fortified enemy
positions or destroying lines of communication.

Moreover, later in the day the

paratroopers were able to form larger units and move onto an objective. Whether or
not these tasks were assigned to them or not are not important but what was important
is that the paratroopers had little or no difficulty moving towards them and trying to
accomplish them.
The controversy surrounding the effectiveness of the Allied Airborne Divisions on
D-Day has surrounded them for the last sixty-five years. Historians and paratroopers
alike have difficulty deciding what was and was not a true objective. However, the
paratroopers were able to confuse the enemy, destroy lines of communication, capture
objectives and destroy batteries of artillery that were killing Americans on the
beachheads.

Although the paratroopers were not able to complete one hundred

percent of their objectives, they did accomplish their primary objective which was to
allow the Allied invasion forces to leave the beachheads. In addition to that they were
able to accomplish many more objectives and caused the German Army to act as
erratically as they did. Although they did not reform and mobilize as expected they
were still able to harass the enemy and complete objectives. Regardless of their
67
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inability to complete all of their objectives they were able to accomplish what their main
goal as soldiers was: kill as many of the enemy as possible and to win the war.
This thesis is intended to investigate several different aspects of the airborne’s
contributions to D-Day. Through the chapter titled “Evolving a Mission and a Myth” the
doctrine and organization of the airborne is investigated. This is important because it
illustrates the tradition and elite nature the airborne exuded. Through understand the
doctrine and organization of the airborne it is possible to ascertain the motivations of
the command staff and paratroopers.
The following chapter addresses the action on D-Day. It also analyzes the
importance in illustrating the movements and tactics of small units. Through moving
from the airfields in England, to the jump into France and finally the paratrooper’s
movements on the ground it is possible to understand how the tactics of the airborne
changed from large scale conventional tactics to small unit or individual based guerilla
warfare. The true effectiveness of the airborne is seen through investigating the small
unit tactics used by the paratroopers when they fought the German army. Although
these tactics have largely been ignored they are the foundation of the paratrooper’s
successes in France.
Finally, the chapter based on tactics and weaponry hopes to illustrate how the
airborne was able to facilitate using guerilla tactics. Asymmetrical tactics were used
before the Second World War never before had an elite force of heavily armed, well
trained and motivated soldiers been placed behind enemy lines to enforce these tactics.
78

The United States placed their entire research and improvement capabilities behind the
improvement of arms and ammunition for the war effort. The airborne received the
majority of the most advance equipment. This equipment allowed the airborne to
conduct guerilla warfare tactics with the most advanced weaponry. In addition to that
the paratroopers were taught the most advanced theories of military science. This
education allowed them to manipulate these tactics to be used by small groups hunting
enemy targets.
Until now the study of the airborne has been concentrated on aspects that were
secondary to its success. The historical problem surrounding the history of the airborne
is that the small units that roamed through the hedgerows were previously ignored by
military historians. The paratrooper’s success relied upon the tactics they used as small
groups not as a large divisional force. Although the promulgation of guerilla warfare
during the seventies and eighties through colonial wars such as the French in Algeria
encouraged historians to write about the airborne in a positive light they still failed to
address the issue. The study of small separated groups of paratroopers that were well
trained, supplied and provoked is the foundation of the history of the airborne on DDay.
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Chapter 4-Surprises, Chaos, Disruption
For the airborne, D-Day was a baptism by fire for most paratroopers. Through
the ride across the channel, the drop itself and the resulting combat each paratrooper
handled himself differently. For some the deadly flight across the channel affected the
way they would conduct combat when they landed. Others found themselves looking
for revenge, searching to destroy the first enemy target they encountered. The way in
which the paratroopers conducted themselves on D-Day was the foundation for how
small groups of soldiers should perform when behind enemy lines. The paratroopers
destroyed artillery batteries, barracks, observations posts and enemy troops. They even
secured the majority of the bridges and causeways on the flanks of the beach heads,
which was their original objective. Because the paratroopers adapted to the situation
they were in they were able to succeed as a combat force.
On a steamy early September day the people of New York City watched
thousands of unmarked GI’s milling around the harbor.

They waited in long lines to

board ships like the SS Samaria and SS Strathnaver. Few of the residents of the city
found it strange that they lacked the unit insignia usually found on the right shoulder of
a soldier. Fewer recognized the jump wings proudly worn upon their chests. The
military was taking few if any risks in regards to the massive logistical operation that was
taking place at that moment in similar ports dotting the Eastern seaboard. They would
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not allow any stray German spy to notice some unit insignia on the shoulder of a young
GI heading to Europe.1
Secrecy was always a primary concern for the military. The paratroopers were
told before they shipped out that they could not let slip to anyone what unit they were
with or any suspicions they had about where they were headed. As these thousands of
newly minted paratroopers stood in lines “packed in like sardines”2 to enter the
transport ships for to Europe, their family and friends were reading letters similar to this
one written by Captain Sobel of Easy Company, 501st PIR, 101st Airborne Division:
Dear Madam, Soon your son [each individual name had been typed in] will drop
from the sky to engage and defeat the enemy. He will have the best of weapons,
and equipment, and have had months of hard, and strenuous training to prepare
him for success on the battlefield. Your frequent letters of love, and
encouragement, will arm him with a fighting heart. With that, he cannot fail, but
will win glory for himself, make you proud of him and his country grateful for his
service in its hour of need.3
Letters such as this one encouraged the friends and families of paratroopers who were
shipping out. Unfortunately, their sons, husbands and fathers could not tell them when
or where they were going before they left because they did not know. However, as
comforting letters such as this one must have been for their families, Captain Sobel’s
loyalty and attachment to the airborne is evident.
Most paratroopers had never been on a boat, much less been out to sea.
Sergeant Guarnere remembers: “Nobody was ever on a boat before in their life, let
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alone getting on a ship like that and going on the ocean.”4 They packed the top decks of
their ships with all of their equipment. Most found the crowd unbearable, as the
military left few amenities for comfort but they all had to catch one last glimpse of the
United States before officially heading out to war. Ocean liners like the Queen Mary,
the Normandy, and even the Titanic were lodged in American popular culture. However
the airborne received and gave up the creature comforts they may have imagined a
transatlantic trip offered. Webster writes: “We left in the morning. There were no
steamer baskets, there was no confetti. There was no ‘all ashore who are going ashore!’
Because nobody was going ashore. Our sole audience was a handful of stevedores
standing by the hawsers.”5 As the once glorious ocean liners pulled away from their
births and headed out to open water the paratroopers saw something that usually
marked a joyous occasion. The paratroopers saw the Statue of Liberty and as they
passed they saluted her.
Slowly at first and then like a fire it spread. “I think everyone was scared,”
Guarnere recalls. “We were going into the unknown. We looked out at the Statue of
Liberty and saluted her as we went past. I remember thinking, This is it, I’m leaving
America, going off to war. I hoped we got over there, got it over with, got out alive and
got home.”6 Early September 1943 proved to be the last time that many of these
paratroopers would ever see the United States. Once upon the ship the paratroopers
found out their destination. They would travel by boat to England and then jump into
4
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France. For most, the trip to England was little more than boring. They played cards,
talked, trained and got sea sick. When they arrived in England, they were welcomed
with open arms. Many officers, including then Lieutenant Winters, grew to love the
host families they were billeted with.
For many paratroopers England was a land of knights and wizards. When they
finally arrived in the small hamlets and villages, the paratroopers realized they were in a
place that could be seen on English postcards. Lieutenant Compton writes: “Aldbourne
was a town you’d see in postcards. Located in a small valley, the village had a town
square dominated by a large church. The surrounding countryside was ideal for military
training with its forests, creeks and green fields.”7 For the remainder of 1943 and the
beginning of 1944 the Airborne trained arduously for combat. The training included
everything from combat exercises to more training jumps. Crookenden writes: “As
winter approached the tempo of training quickened. In December, the staffs and signals
were practiced in command post exercises and each regimental combat team carried
out a field exercise and a drop.”8 The training helped the men prepare for real combat
situations in a foreign land. They tested tactics, map reading and the use of different
weapons. The men and the people of England new that the increase in training could
mean only one thing: D-Day was approaching.
During their stay in England, the 101st spent its time training but during their
spare time the paratroopers were allowed to fraternize with the local English populace,
7
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with the officers billeting with local families. Officers often became very close with
these families. Lieutenant Richard Winters, “E” Company, 506th PIR, became so attached
to his host family that he considered them his “second family.”9 Enlisted men also
enjoyed their time in England. They also socialized with the English, but once D-Day,
approached security around the camps became tighter-in fact that the camps were
surrounded by barbed wire, guarded by military police. There were machineguns at the
corners of the camps, and the paratroopers were forbidden to talk to the guards.10
Paratrooper McKenzie remembers: “Security was tight-a double row of barbed-wire
fences surrounded the invasion force camps with a four-yard space between them. We
stood guard inside the fence and military police (MP’s) stood guard outside. The
compound thus was more like a prison than an army camp.”11 These measures were
necessary due to the fact that the paratroopers had detailed knowledge of the
operation including but not limited to locations and objectives. 12 It was imperative that
their knowledge not fall into the enemy’s hand.
On the evening of June 4, 1944, the men of the 101st Airborne Division sat
patiently killing time waiting for the aforementioned “GO.” This particular evening the
men were given a “condemned person’s’ fancy meal” as Technician 5 th Grade Gordon E.
King said about the best meal he had ever received while in the army.13 Suddenly,
movies were stopped and lights were turned on, prayers and craps games alike were
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interrupted and military police stormed in a hail of commotion into recreation halls,
movie theaters and barracks and told the Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOS) and
officers that “tonight would be the night.”14 Throughout the next few hours the men of
the 101st did many different things to prepare for that night’s jump. After their “last
meal” a final equipment check was done and then they enjoyed a last minute bathroom
break, blackened their faces and checked their weapons for the last time. Many men
shaved their heads like Mohawk Indians.15

Keegan writes: “It did mean that the

Americans would have to put forth every shred of that red Indian bravery which, with a
last-minute sprouting of Mohawk haircuts and smearing of red and white war paint,
many of the young bloods in the battalions were nerving themselves to emulate if they
were to come through.”16 This was said to be done because the Germans had heard
reports that the American Airborne Divisions were comprised of convicts that were said
to have shaved their heads in that manner. Finally word arrived that Rome had fallen to
advancing allied troops in the Mediterranean, but most men were too worried about
their own baptism by fire to be concerned the Italian Campaign. Weapons were
checked and rechecked. The paratroopers were ready if not willing.
Throughout the entire day of June 5, 1944, thousands of men comprising the
two American Airborne Division’s, the 101st and 82nd, were scattered across southern
England and in cities such as Aldbourne, Chilton-Foliat, Froxfield and Ramsbury, waiting
for the “GO” that would signal the largest and most logistically intricate invasion in
14
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history. They later learned that this signal would be delayed twenty-four hours due to
inclement weather over the Normandy coast.17 The weather on the English Channel
during the late spring can always be cause for some alarm. Sudden cold fronts can bring
large swells, wind and low thick cloud cover. The decision to launch was in the hands of
one man, General Eisenhower. Although the weather on June 6 was still not ideal the
tides and previous weather patterns left no doubt. Eisenhower exclaimed, “I’m quite
positive we must give the order, I don’t like it, but there it is … don’t see how we can
possibly do anything else.”18 During the next twenty-four hours the men spent their
time praying, playing dice and cards, watching a movie or rechecking their previously
checked equipment. Months and years of training were converging on the moment
they all knew would happen, D-Day.
The sounds of rumbling M35 “deuce and half” trucks roaring through camps and
into airfields across southern England and filled with paratroopers packed to the tee
with equipment and supplies could be heard clearly on the evening of June 5, 1944. The
people of England immediately knew what the commotion was about. There was only
one place the airborne troops were headed from their beautiful little villages and
hamlets. Once the trucks arrived at their designated airfields with C-47/DC-3 Dakota
transport planes, the men unloaded and began to gather and put on their equipment.
Before the jumpmasters helped the paratroopers put on their equipment they handed
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out stacks of paper. Each sheet contained the now legendary message from General
Eisenhower about the magnitude of the great task at hand.
Soldiers, sailors and airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force! You are about to
embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many
months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of libertyloving people everywhere march with you. Good luck! And let us beseech the
blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.19

General Eisenhower worried about the fate of the airborne. Although he believed that
the invasion would fail without their success, he anticipated that many of the young
paratroopers would be killed. Historian Irving writes: “He recalled Leigh-Mallory’s
written prediction, the day before, that more than three quarters of these airborne
troops would be immediate casualties. But their operations on the Cherbourg peninsula
were vital for the success of the Utah beach, and Eisenhower had one record, tooordering the jump to go ahead.”20 With the poop sheets passed out the paratroopers
nervously awaited what was to be their first combat jump in World War Two.
As the paratroopers waited to board the C-47’s, checking and rechecking
equipment, they believed that the only remaining surprise awaited them on the
Normandy Coast, but they were mistaken. Suddenly, jumpmasters appeared, telling
each man to take and swallow one small white pill, which was supposed to help prevent
air sickness while in flight over the English Channel.

With the air sickness pills

distributed and ingested, the paratroopers once again sat down to wait. The engines
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began roaring to life and slowly and almost imperceptibly the paratroopers could feel
the planes start moving down the runway.

Dwayne Burns, an 82nd Airborne

Communications Sergeant, remembers the anxiety he felt while “waiting in line.” He
writes: “The planes started to taxi in what looked like a never-ending procession toward
the end of the runway. This was much bigger than a practice jump. I listened as
planeload after planeload of troopers took off, one right after another, and I watched
what I could out the window. The throttles of the plane I rode in were advanced and
then pulled back several times. It seemed we only inched forward. Our aircrew waited
for their turn, but I believed the waiting was worse for us jumpers.”21 For the airborne,
the waiting was always the hardest part. Either on the ground or in the air, they often
waited for hours to jump into combat. As the droves of planes took off down the
runaway, they flew in a holding pattern until all of the Dakota’s had left the runaway.
These times were for levity, prayer and, for some, sleep.
As the short flight progressed for what seemed like hours the men of the
airborne did what they could to keep their minds off of the jump and their own
mortality. Sergeants Burns spent his the time in the Dakota praying and thinking of the
girl he left back home: “I mentally repeated the 23rd Psalm. My card was placed in my
helmet and I reached up and touched it every once and awhile. The LORD is my
shepherd I shall not want. Yet I do want, I want to live, why do I want to live so bad?”22
Prayer brought a welcome solace to many on the flight to France. Catholic paratroopers
21
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read their Rosaries provided a steady hand and nourished a courageous soul. Ambrose
notes: “Like many of the Catholic troopers, ‘Dutch’ Schultz was ‘totally engrossed in my
rosaries.’ Clayton Storeby was sitting next to George Dickson, who ‘was going around
that rosary, giving a lot of Hail Marys. After about ten minutes, it seemed like it was
helping him, so I said, ‘George, when you’re through with that, would you loan it to a
buddy?’”23 Others felt that peace and quiet and cigarette was the only cure for the
stress that engulfed the paratroopers. However, most troopers passed the time of the
journey with conversation with their fellow paratroopers and laughter.

The one

symptom that seemed to aflict the entire airborne were the stomach pains and nausea
caused by tension. Nordyke quotes paratrooper Elmo Jones: “In the plane, some of the
men had upset stomachs because of the tension and nerves. Some men could not
speak. I was so afraid that I would be the same way that I said a prayer again that I had
said on previous combat two combat jumps. It was simple and it was this: ‘Lord thy will
be done. But if I’m to die, please help me die like a man.’ And then everything seemed
to be OK.”24 The peace and quiet was short lived. Once the air armada reached the Nazi
French outpost islands of Guernsey and Jersey the airborne was under direct fire from
enemy anti-aircraft fire. Regardless of their actions on the plane ride to England the
paratroopers did what they could to pass the time as easily as possible.
The view from the air was breathtaking for the sticks that chose to have the door
removed from their Dakotas. The night of June 5 and the early morning of June 6th,
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1944 the weather was still and calm with clouds over the Normandy Coast. The planes
once again leveled out at 1,000 feet. For most the ride to France was pleasant and
smooth. The storms that had plagued the invasion area for the previous weeks had
blown over and the views of the invasion fleet and the French coast had never before
been seen. Elmo Jones recalls. “The C-47 with its door off [gave me] the ability to look
out at sea and watch the water…watching the ships on the Channel as we flew over the
top.”25 These Dakotas brought the airborne behind the shores of the invasion beaches
of Utah and Omaha. The planes flew steady in “V of V formations, nine abreast as far as
the eye could see. The planes seem to fill the entire sky.”26 The paratroopers were not
the only ones that were treated to some amazing vistas. Although they were able to
witness the largest invasion flotilla ever assembled, they were not able to witness their
own feat, as hundreds of Dakotas flew over Hitler’s Atlantic Wall.
As the men of the airborne divisions flew over the massive invasion fleet, the
men below in transport craft looked up at the first blow to “Hitler’s Atlantic Wall.” Ryan
writes about one particular instance when the last formation of planes passed by and
gave the troops below one more sliver of hope. Ryan writes: “Nobody could say a word.
And then as the last formation flew over, an amber light blinked down through the
clouds on the fleet below. Slowly it flashed out in Morse code three dots and a dash: V
for Victory.”27

For most soldiers and sailors the ride to Europe was nothing but
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sickening. Those lucky enough to be on deck on the misty early morning of June 6 were
treated to a sight that made most of them feel a little better.
Right after this last symbol of hope was dashed out, the formations of hundreds
of C-47 Dakotas entered into a thick cloud bank. Although the pilots of the C-47’s were
extremely well trained, they were unprepared to enter such a large cloud formation.
The strict formations that were maintained during the flight over the Channel were
broken up and the pilots were forced to fly on instinct and alone. Compton remembers:
“As we neared our drop zone, the weather grew overcast, and more and more antiaircraft flak began to hit near our plane.”28 Once the Dakotas hit the cloud bank they
were unable to keep in formation because the lead planes in the formations, or the
center of the “v,” were the only planes that had radar and Eureka receivers installed in
them. In order to guide the planes behind, a small green light was installed in a clear
bubble on the top of the plane. The planes behind the lead were ordered to maintain
their direction and speed based on these lights.
The C-47 Dakota pilots were not trained to fly in low lying clouds over the drop
zones and the beaches. After several seconds of flying through very little visibility, pilots
had to contend with accurate and consistent fire from German antiaircraft batteries
placed all along the Cherbourg Peninsula. Paratrooper Joseph F. “Frank” Brumbaugh of
the 82nd Airborne Division recalls: “We picked up flak that I swear was solid enough to
walk on. There were shells bursting all over the sky. We flew through this solid flak all
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the way over to where we jumped.”29 The heavy Nazi anti-aircraft fire was a surprise for
the paratroopers, the pilots of the Dakotas, the navy, and Allied intelligence. After the
Allied air forces had achieved complete air superiority, they attacked Nazi targets of
opportunity such as enemy AA sites. They believed that they had knocked out most and
that any AA fire that followed would be minimal. Intelligence had previously stated that
heavy Army Air Corps and Naval bombing would eliminate most if not all ground to air
fire. Heavy and accurate antiaircraft fire and the cloud bank forced the C-47 pilots to
lower or raise altitude and increase speed significantly.30
The combat jump procedure for paratroopers was engrained into their muscle
memory of paratroopers. They followed a set of strict procedures that the saved a
sense of normalcy to an action that was inherently the opposite of one’s instincts.
Compton remembers that routine:
Normally a red light would flash on, and we’d have three minutes to stand up,
check our gear one last time, and get ready for the jump. Then a green light was
supposed to flash, which meant it was time for us all to bail out. I was
jumpmaster and positioned to be first out of the door. The red light flashed. All
my guys are edgy right now, I thought, so I’m not going to stand up and have us
all standing around nervous. I’ll wait a few seconds before I stand. Before I could
even blink, the green light flashed-way ahead of schedule. We had to get out of
the plane-now! Something must have happened, maybe our pilot missed our
dropzone.31
Most of the paratroopers did not know that when the green light turned on, they were
still several miles and several minutes from their destination. Even after they landed
few paratroopers understood the gravity of the misdrop. Sergeant Malarkey writes:
29
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“Later, we’d learn that we’d been dropped several miles west of our drop zone, which
might have been a blessing in disguise because our target area, we later found, was
crawling with krauts. We had landed about three quarters of a mile east of Ste.-MereÉglise, about five miles inland from Utah Beach.”32 At the time, the paratroopers
believed that the pilots of the Dakotas would never turn on the “green light” before the
dropzone, and it would take years to understand why they were so badly misdropped.
The cloudbank, enemy flak, and ensuing chaos unnerved the pilots to the point
that paratroopers were dropped on average up to two miles off course from the
designated drop zones. These mixed drops prevented any chance the airborne had to
regroup quickly. Not only were the paratroopers unaware of how badly they were
dropped, but the confusion only escalated when they ran into other paratroopers who
were supposed to be tens of miles away.
The ensuing differences in altitude and air speed among the C-47s created
scattered flight paths that made it impossible for the pilots to drop their paratroopers in
their correct locations. The drops were so ineffective and confused that the 101st and
the 82nd Airborne Divisions were mixed together and both generally landed far from
their respective drop zones. Guarnere writes: “Guys were joining up from the 82nd,
501st, 502nd, all different outfits. Some stayed, some left, and some went and hid in a
bar. Everyone was looking for their outfit. No one knew what was going on.” 33 They
also lost sixty percent of their equipment including mortars, ammunition and radios.
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The loss of equipment and the scattering of paratroopers complicated the airborne’s
mission on the field of battle.
The majority of the paratroopers landed in France alone, without a weapon and
far from the dropzones they had studied in England. Panic seemed to grip the pilots at
the Normandy coast. Some pilots even dropped their sticks in the ocean before making
landfall. Although Lieutenant Compton was lucky enough to have a smooth drop, he
heard that some of his platoon was not so lucky: “We learned later that flight conditions
inside some of the other planes were horrifying. Bullets from antiaircraft fire streamed
inside the planes, caging the soldiers in. Ironically, all that most men in those conditions
wanted to do was exit the planes and jump into the fray below. Some pilots strayed off
course. Some panicked and dropped their men in the sea, drowning them all. Some
flew too low-with soldiers plummeting to the ground without enough time for their
chutes to deploy.”34 The loss of equipment was particularly common. Lieutenant
Winters states:“Worse yet, I had no weapon because my M-1 and grenades had been
ripped off from the shock of the prop-blast as soon as I had exited the plane. In the
distance a machine gun was firing into the night sky as other paratroopers descended
into the Normandy countryside.”35

Paratroopers recalled that the prop blast, the

backwash from the engines of the planes, was so strong that shortly after they realized
what was happening it was time for them to prepare to land.36 Many paratroopers like
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Lieutenant Winters, landing without a weapon and alone, were still eager to fight and
complete their objectives.
On the ground, it was pitch-black and terror began to set in. Although the
paratroopers were well trained and could cope, they were faced with a myriad of
frightening situations. Everything from goats to herds of cattle caught the paratroopers
off guard.37 Some unlucky paratroopers landed in the middle of Nazi soldiers or in a tree
where death was often a foregone conclusion. Ruggero explains one situation in which
several paratroopers were killed before they could even take their parachutes off and
find their weapons: “They fired as they ran, catching some of the Americans before they
could even free their weapons. It was over in a few minutes, and four paratroopers
were dead in the darkness at the edge of town.”38 The public and the high command
came to understand the airborne’s mission as risky and lethal.
In most cases these images of men dying in the air, in trees or on the ground
provided the surviving paratroopers with something to fight for. Malarkey states:
“Some paratroopers, I’d later learn, would die in such trees, target practice for the
Germans come daybreak. Some didn’t even make it that far. In either shot-down planes
or hanging limp from parachutes, with bullets in them, they were dead on arrival.”39
Catastrophes such as this one were fairly common on D-Day. The paratroopers quickly
became accustomed to seeing their brothers in arms and countrymen wounded, lying
helpless on the ground and dead in ditches throughout the hedgerows.
37
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In one tragic

case the 101st Airborne Division, German soldiers located an equipment drop and
immediately set an ambush for those sent to recover the equipment.

Once the

unsuspecting paratroopers arrived, the German soldiers opened fire on them, greeting
them with a hail of bullets.40 Situations such as these and the extreme conditions in
which the jump was made caused the casualties for airborne to be exceptionally high.
Despite casualties and scattering, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions still
captured and held the flanks of the Allied invasion forces as well as the causeways and
exits from the beach heads. Malarkey states: “That quickly, a key objective had been
taken. Krause cut the communications cable point. His men held the roads leading into
St.-Mere-Église, most importantly the main highway from Caen to Cherbourg.”41
Disabled communication lines prevented the German Army from summoning
reinforcements and sending invasion information to headquarters in a timely manner.
Most importantly however was the fact that the Germany Army could not implement
Hitler’s and Field Marshall Jodle’s plan to concentrate armor at the beachheads in case
of invasion. Keegan writes: “It was therefore vital that the Panzer divisions, which alone
had the capability for rapid, off-road movement, should be positioned close to the
invasion zone, to hold a line until the infantry reinforcements arrived.”42 Cutting the
communication lines was not one of the main objectives for the 101 st Airborne Division
but it turned into one of the most successful tactical strikes with far-reaching
consequences, that day. With Hitler’s prized Panzer divisions idle fifty miles from the
40
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invasion beaches there was little chance for significant German reinforcement and
counterattack in Normandy. The result, catastrophic for the Germans, was the Allied
lodgment in Normandy.
In addition to casualties, the airborne had thousands of paratroopers missing by
the end of D-Day. Crookenden explains in great detail the missing and casualties the
airborne had on D-day:“Of the 6,600 men of the 101st Division who had dropped that
morning, 3,500 were missing as D-Day ended; 182 had been killed in action and 537
wounded. By August 1944, there were still 1,240 men missing; some of them were
eventually traced as prisoners of war, but many more had drowned in the marshes and
the sea.”43

He goes on to write about the 82nd Airborne Division: “of the 2188

parachute troops to drop on Drop Zone N, 2183 jumped, two refused and one was
wounded in the aircraft. Only 17 out of 132 stick landed on or near the drop zone, with
another 16 within a mile of it. Some men fell into the River Douve; some dropped eight
miles to the east in 101st Division area; two sticks jumped over Valognes nine miles to
the north; and five more near Cherbourg. For the next four days, the 508th was unable
to complete any of its tasks.”44 On the other hand, German casualties were far larger.
To this day it is hard to ascertain what exactly their losses were on D-Day. However it is
estimated that their casualties ranged from four to nine thousand.

43
44

Crookenden, Dropzone Normandy, 110.
Ibid., 129.

97

The airborne casualty rates were cause for much of the negative publicity that
surrounded the airborne after the war. Some historians, veterans, and commanders
argue that the airborne casualties were far too high in proportion to their effectiveness.
Although the majority of their objectives were met, the high losses they incurred was
not worth their achievements. Most vocal of these critics was the American military’s
chief historian, S.L.A. Marshall. He addressed every major action that the airborne faced
from their landings in the marshes and fields to specific engagements that particular
units and regiments fought in. Throughout all these discussions Marshall projects a
picture of waste and failure: “When Ames walked out in the direction they had taken,
he was one of the wisest men in Normandy-the first to know that the 82nd Division plan
had fallen apart.”45 Marshall believes not only that the airborne actions should not have
taken place but of the work that the airborne divisions on D-Day was useless and
ineffective.
Marshall begins his critique: “From the beginning, what threw the paratroopers
and confused operations along the line of the Merderet River was the presence of the
marshes. This was not according to the script.”46 Because of poor intelligence, the
second the paratroopers landed in France they were immediately thrown off course and
believed they were in a completely different location. Marshall states: “Many drowned.
Those more fortunate had equipment fouled and bodies worn nigh to exhaustion before
they could shoulder arms. Twice a betrayer, the marsh, where it lost the grapple, lied to
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them about where they stood and which way to go. It blocked the concentration of
thought as of men.”47 The confusion of the marshes was the first case of the airborne’s
failures.
One Hundred and First Airborne Division historians and D-Day veterans
Northwood and Rapport come to the same conclusions. Marshes and misdrops broke
up and scattered airborne formations and blunted the edge of the assault. They
illustrate: “The Douve River, with its marshes, water meadows, and lock-controlled
inundated areas, was an important water barrier: control by the Germans of its
crossings would aid an armored counter attack from the South against the Utah
Beachhead.”48 For the paratroopers themselves the marshes were often the most
difficult part of the night. After the terror in the C-47’s, their landing provided little
relief. Sergeant Pat Lindsey remembers: “Instead of the land that I expected, there was
only a large body of water below me. I tried to aim for a small finger of land on which
stood a large silo. I tried to manipulate my chute toward the projection of land but the
wind was not cooperating and kept carrying me out over the water no matter how I
tried to slip toward land. I hit the water-went completely under into the soft gummy
bottom. I fought my way to the top and flapped my arms to stay afloat with all my
equipment trying to pull me under.”49 Sergeant Lindsey was lucky enough to survive the
marshes.

Many of his friends were not.
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paratroopers died from drowning in the marshes.) However, the paratroopers were
unfortunately not finished with the troublesome flooded lowlands of Normandy.
The marshes provoked another major problem for the airborne, communication.
Throughout the entire day of June 6, 1944, commanders had extreme difficulty
communicating with their troops while in or out of combat. Marshall writes, “No
information was coming back.”50 Because commanders were unable to locate and
communicate with their troops they were virtually useless on D-Day. More often than
not commanders sent out runners to relay messages to their platoon and squad leaders,
but the runners rarely found their way or their units. Keegan illustrates this through the
experiences of Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Krause. Keegan describes a situation in
which the paratrooper’s lines of communication completely failed. The LieutenantColonel sent the message, “I am in Ste. Mere-Église,”51 but the runner he sent
disappeared. More often than not the messages that airborne commanders sent were
never received or in some cases the commanders never sent them due to lack of
organized units. Poor communications hindered the execution of large-scale or even
small-scale attacks. One example of this, although not of the 101st but the 82nd, was a
comment Marshall had about Major General Matthew Ridgway. “Amid battle, his
personal isolation was nigh complete. As a soldier, he was doing his part nobly; as a
chief, he was almost devoid of power to direct anything, because of the collapse of
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communications.”52 In several circumstances, high-ranking officers led patrols, scouting
missions, and even fought as infantrymen after the drop. Northwood and Rapport
write: “Major Legere led a squad, lieutenants served as scouts. The abundance of brass
caused General Taylor to remark, ‘Never were so few led by so many.’” 53 Without
communications field commanders were unable to view the battlefield in a tactical
manner, and they were unable to regroup and mobilize their troops.
After the drop, paralysis among some paratroopers also slowed or prevented
regrouping. According to some veterans, these paratroopers believed that surviving the
jump no longer obligated them to move on to their objectives. These men were simply
too terrified to move at night. They judged that regrouping with the rest of their stick
was too risky. So they found a hedgerow to duck into until daybreak. Dr. Lewis
remembers:
All I can tell you is that eventually I found I would sometimes, I’d move around in
the dark and got scared because I might run right into a machine gun nest. I
didn’t like to do that. I like to find a place pretty secure, if I could, but still a little
daylight. And I did this one thing. I might have waited a little too long for that. I
went into a hedgerow and got back in the corner, and I thought this would be a
good place, and I sat down, put my rifle across my lap and leaned into the
hedgerow. Eventually you lie down after you get more comfortable, and the
least little sound I would have awakened, believe me, in a second, but I slept
pretty well that night, as I recall. I woke up, and there was a gun emplace-I mean
a tank emplacement I found that-it was all smoothed out, and all the tad to do
was-he could have come right in there.54
Because of the chaos after the drop, the paratroopers placed their own security above
regrouping with their platoons.

According to Marshall, completing the tactical
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objectives given to them became a secondary concern.

Thousands of scared

paratroopers did ever thing they could to survive.
The trauma inflicted upon the paratroopers by the low-level, high-speed combat
jump on D-Day altered their mentality from one of action to one of survival. Marshall
writes: “They fought when they were confronted beyond choice, and some of the
results were spectacular.”55 But in general they were no longer an effective combat
group but rather many small bands of a guerilla-like forces operating behind enemy
lines. Some of the small forces were effective when confronted by the enemy. On the
other hand the German army very rarely sought action against the paratroopers.
Marshall notes: “In fact, there is not one single example of German troops acting
counter offensively against the Americans in the night drop, though opportunities were
numerous.”56 The German Ost battalion was incapacitated without their command and
control structure.

Because the Paratroopers were able to kill some commanding

officers, destroy lines of communication, and generally disrupt the enemy the Germans
were unable to conduct a counteroffensive that would corner the paratroopers and
corral the invasion of the beaches.
In some cases, however, the paratroopers were completely outnumbered,
outgunned and outmatched.

At the battle of the La Fière Bridge, a company of

paratroopers became trapped on a causeway (raised road above the marsh) and took
fire from three directions. After an entire morning of combat, these men of the 505th
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PIR were once again bombarded by heavy German artillery. With nowhere to hide on
the causeway, when the German mortar and artillery fire started, the paratroopers
jumped into shallow foxholes and hid behind the few trees that were scattered along
the edge of the causeway. Paratrooper Robert Murphy writes: “Since 0800 hours the
mortars and heavy artillery had intensified, including the horrifying tree bursts. We
were in our foxholes, but of necessity craning our necks looking out for the enemy
approach.”57 After the intense artillery barrage ceased, the German armor and infantry
rolled forward against the lightly armed paratroopers with on a few anti-tank weapons.
Murphy describes the large enemy action: “The enemy attack across the causeway
bean. It was once again heralded by the slow approach of two of the same type of
Renault tanks with another 200 enemy foot soldiers following behind and interspaced
with the tanks. Two additional German tanks followed, for a total of four supporting the
onslaught.”58 The Renault tanks were French light tanks left over from the First World
War. Although ineffective against other armor the light tanks were still useful when
attacking infantry. Though inflicting heavy losses on both sides, the airborne was able
to take the causeway a few days later, after being resupplied.
Their gung-ho nature enabled the paratroopers to withstand grave
disadvantages, such as those encountered at the causeway during the battle of the La
Fière Bridge. Murphy writes: “He took a piece of paper from a little note pad, wrote
something on it, and told me, ‘Here, I’ve come to give this to Sergeant Owens.’ Ducking

57
58

Robert M. Murphy, No Better Place to Die (New York: Critical Hit, 2000), 94.
Ibid., 94.

103

incoming shells and bullets, I ran back across the road to Owens and the remnant
platoon and gave him the note. As he read the message, I told him what Dolan had said
to me. When I asked him what the message said, he replied, ‘We stay. There is no
better place to die.’”59 Capturing the causeways to the east and west of the beachheads
was the airborne’s primary objective. They did not want to surrender La Fière Bridge
and the causeway.
Despite Marshall’s critique, the roving bands of paratroopers were
extraordinarily effective against the static German army in Western France. McKenzie
states: “Wandering groups of paratroopers held up many of the German reinforcements
and confused their high command as to where the main landings were. Although not
planned this way, the division had accomplished its primary mission by preventing the
enemy from reinforcing the strong defensive positions in the heights above Utah
Beach.”60 Their guerilla actions inadvertently accomplished some objectives, confusing
the German commanders and helping to prevent German reinforcements of the beach
exits.
Other historians deferred the airborne’s record on D-Day. In the first-twenty
four hours of the Allied invasion of France American Airborne casualties were expected
to be extremely high. These expectations were found to be exaggerated, and Ryan
suggests that airborne casualties were acceptable.

Ryan gives several estimates:

“Included in this compilation are 82nd and 101st airborne losses, which alone are
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estimated at 2,499 killed, wounded and missing.”61

Considering that over 15000

airborne troops were used on D-Day the odds were still in favor of them. The 101st
Airborne took significant losses during their time in France. “E” Company of the 506 th
PIR of the 101st Airborne took the heaviest casualties in the campaign with a total of
983, equal to about fifty percent.62 According to Ryan, however terrible these casualties
were they were still acceptable losses in terms of the overall mission. The Airborne was
still hampered the German Army’s ability to stop the invasion on June 6, 1944
Despite the criticisms of the airborne’s performance, paratroopers did destroy
some targets and capture some positions. One of the first objectives given to the units
of the airborne was to cut the communication lines of the German Army. As soon as
small units of paratroopers regrouped they immediately looked for targets of
opportunity, such as telephone lines and cables. Captain Charles Shettle and a small
group of fifteen found a casement for communication lines and destroyed it. Ambrose
writes, “Within a half hour of his drop, Shettle had gathered fifteen men From Company
I. He set out, found the casement, placed the charges, and destroyed it, (Years later an
officer from the German 6th Parachute Regiment, deployed in the area, told Shettle that
the Germans were astonished that the American had been able to disrupt their primary
source of communication so quickly.”63 In many instances lone soldiers destroyed these
communication lines as a target of opportunity. One private recalls, “Along the way, in
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Herouvillete, we cut down the telephone wires, it seemed a reasonable thing to do.”64
Sergeant Malarkey describes his experience: “Out of the darkness came three horsedrawn carts and a handful of German soldiers, apparently hauling ammo toward the
beach. We jumped them, rifles aimed at their faces. The horses got jumpy. Our guys
were shouting; their guys were shouting. We took fifteen German prisoners. We
marched them into a group, rifles at their backs.” 65 During D-Day the men of the
scattered airborne harassed German troops and disrupted communications, relieving
some pressure on the landing beaches.
In spite of the terrible drop, the lack of supplies and the complete disorientation
of most of the division small units of paratroopers were still able to complete the
objectives handed down to them by General Eisenhower and the General Staff. Due to
the heroics of several individuals and some small squads they were able to complete
most of its objectives as well as destroying key communication lines and creating mass
confusion for the German Army. “They were however, aided by an even greater
German confusion. The cutting of telephone wires by paratroopers and the resistance
had proved an invaluable tactic.”66 They were, however, unable to capture the bridges
over the Douve River and capture the city of Carentan securing the flanks of the Allied
invasion forces. Ambrose, like most modern historians, does not clearly assert whether
or not the paratrooper’s actions on D-Day were a success or not. He does clearly state
that they completed the primary task of destroying communication lines and creating
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confusion but he later states that they were unable to complete all of their other
objectives. Ambrose does state, however, that the without the 101 st and 82nd Divisions
the invasion forces would have been a complete failure. . Keegan provides evidence for
this fact when he writes: “Three German divisions, the 709 th, 352nd and 716th, were thus
to undergo attack by eight Allied divisions without any immediate support from their
higher headquarters. The 709th and 716th found themselves in particularly desperate
straits. Neither was of good quality and both lacked any means of maneuver. The first
was defending the area on which the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were dropping as
well as Utah beach, where the US 4th Division was assaulting from the sea. It was almost
an impossible mission.”67 The Germany Army would have been able to cut the Allied
forces off at the beach heads, seize the exits and man the causeways. After they had
done that they would have been able to have a concentrated counterattack with heavy
artillery that would have surely destroyed the beleaguered invasion forces stuck in the
sand and water of the Normandy Beaches. “If the paratroopers were not there to seize
the causeway exits, the entire 4th Division would be endangered. But cancelation of
Utah would so badly disarrange the elaborate plan as to endanger the whole Overlord
operation.”68
Historians do not make a clear assessment as to whether or not the airborne on
D-Day was a success. They most often comment on the success of small combat groups
attacking German positions but they also comment about the paratrooper’s inability to
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regroup into one large fighting force like they had been trained. It is important to note
that one must take into consideration both the high casualties and their failure to
regroup with that of the paratrooper’s ability to confuse the German army and their
ability to destroy targets of opportunity. With both representations it is possible to
create a clear view of what the paratroopers of the airborne faced on D-Day. Although
they had many failures, they experienced the stress of airborne combat infantry had
never before been assessed and in that the paratroopers were largely unprepared for
what they faced during the early morning hours of June 6th. Other than select units of
the 82nd Airborne that participated in the combat jumps in North Africa and Sicily, most
paratroopers had never dropped into a combat situation before. With that in mind, the
paratroopers did excel at would today become the most common and lethal form of
tactics, strategy, guerilla warfare against a well-entranced and armed conventional
force.

108

Chapter 5-Tactics and Weapons
The paratroopers received the most advance training and weaponry available.
The implemented them in the field with ingenuity and innovation. Although they had
trained as a division they were able to use these skills as small groups and units. This
creativity not only saved many of their lives but also allowed them to complete the
majority of their objectives. Throughout this chapter it is important to note how the
paratroopers were able to utilize the tools given to them while under duress. In
addition to that it is also important to note that the tactics that were taught to the
airborne were largely not used in France. The paratroopers were forced to manipulate
what they had learned in the United States and England to what was useful in the field.
This is what made the paratroopers so successful on D-Day, their ability to apply what
they had learned to what they could use while in small units or groups.
The airborne was given the most advanced weaponry and was taught the most
advanced tactics available at the time. The tactics used by the airborne on D-Day are
some of the most studied strategies of military history today. For many years historians
of the airborne and D-Day were decidedly negative towards the paratrooper’s actions.
In most cases today, after seventy years of tactical development, the United States
studies the paratrooper’s actions as perfect examples of guerilla warfare in action by an
elite unit against a conventional force. The airborne perfected the weaponry and tactics
they employed during the Word War Two. The United States military later used their
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adaptations of guerilla warfare during the Korean War, Vietnam and even in recent
history during the First and Second Gulf Wars.
Unfortunately, the jump school curriculum concentrated on teaching the
airborne set combat tactics, large-scale unit movements, and commands. When they
did study small group actions, they learned platoon size movements. The positive
outcome on D-Day was the result more of field training than of classroom study.
Major Winters attributes much of his combat tactics and strategy to the Army
manual. He also enjoyed the activities in the airborne that required him to exercise his
intellect and what he had learned throughout his life. Classroom instruction covered
everything from tactics and strategy to munitions and ranging. Winters writes: “Classes
covered myriad military topics ranging from demonstrations on the functions of supply
to firepower demonstrations on fortifications with tanks and trucks.”1 The training the
airborne received at Camp Toccoa, and other camps like it also taught them how to
survive when caught behind enemy lines with little or no equipment.
Most of the paratroopers could not name the tactics they used while in
Normandy, but they were certain that what they were doing was effective. Rapport
states, “Thus men in strange fields were trying to find their buddies, locate a familiar
landmark, and get on toward memorized missions.”2 Paratroopers of the 82nd and 101st
did everything they could to regroup as quickly as possible on hitting the ground. PFC
Charles Miller explains what his training taught him to do when he landed in a foreign
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land: “I landed without event. And, getting out of my equipment, of course I set out to
‘roll up the stick’ and find my men, any men that I could take command of them and
move to our objective.”3 It was vital that a single paratrooper find a companion because
one paratrooper could be ineffective but two or more was a lethal fighting force. Once
they did regroup, they engaged German targets as soon as they appeared. Both the
82nd and 101st paratroopers were adept at finding fellow troopers on the ground.
Whether from fear or excitement to join the fight and or shear blood lust the
paratroopers excelled at fighting German soldiers and reducing their positions.
The act of killing was the most fundamental tactic learned and then practiced.
Some paratroopers hid in the hedgerows and ditches of France but most, when
encountered by German soldiers, fought ferociously and more often than not, they won.
Albert M. Hassenzahl recalls his first combat experience: “This lead Kraut, he came face
to face with me not, oh, more than 30 inches, 36 inches away from my face. And he
looked in my face and everything happened in seconds.

I had shifted my-oh,

milliseconds really, I had shifted my Tommy gun so that it was pointed forward, and as
soon as he saw me and I knew he saw me, I let him have a burst from the Tommy gun.
And then all hell broke loose. The other Krauts and the patrol reacted and they were
firing at the top of the embankment. ”4 The paratroopers were trained to kill without
hesitation and Hassenzahl, thousands of paratroopers killed their enemies without a
second thought in the lethal shadows of D-Day.
3
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remembers: “Our mission is to capture or kill, as far as what they’re going in now. And
that’s what it is. But you don’t think about it. You know, I never thought about it
really.”5 Before paratroopers left England, they were very specifically told that their
primary mission was to kill. They killed the enemy in every way possible, attacking in
small groups, in large groups, from the shadows, in plain sight, with rifles or any other
weapons they may have had on them.
Weapons systems and other military technologies were the tools of their lethal
trade. Part of a paratrooper’s training was to understand and be able to use a variety of
different weapons. The airborne received the most advanced set of weaponry among
Allied forces. The paratroopers trained with every weapon used by the different
airborne combat teams. Each man could substitute himself in a variety positions in a
fire team. Frederic W. Byers explains: “The Rifleman’s Medal was the type gun that you
used on the gun-course, now in the airborne we had to know every gun from a .45
caliber automatic to a .37 millimeter anti-tank gun, we had to be able to handle each
one of those guns efficiently, so that whatever position we was in we could take over.” 6
This ability was important to the paratroopers when they landed in France because it
allowed them, when often without a weapon, to fight using the resources that were at
their disposal. T/5 Frank Brumbaugh states: “We were ordered not to shoot unless it
was totally in self defense.

Since I couldn’t make any noise, I tossed a white

phosphorous grenade down at their feet through the hedgerow. It makes a small pop
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when it goes off, very little noise. It will devastate anything in the area, and it can’t be
put out.”7 Such flexibility and adaptability was crucial for the paratroopers, for many
landed in France with little other than a pocket knife.
Another combat tactic employed by the airborne was psychological in nature.
Before D-Day the German army was inundated with news articles detailing the makeup
of the airborne. As noted earlier much of the German army believed that the American
airborne divisions were comprised of criminals, murderers, and psychopaths. The
paratroopers did everything they could to facilitate this incorrect assumption, for
instance, shaving their heads like Mohawk Indians.8 They applied war paint to their
faces and darkened their skin with charcoal and green paint. This costuming served
both a psychological and tactical purpose. Not only did their appearance strike fear into
the hearts of their enemies, it also prevent the reflection of light off of their skin and
increased their ability to blend into the shadowy environment that they jumped into.9
The face paint and shaved heads also identified the paratroopers with the Native
American warrior tradition much admired in some army circles.
Along with destroying lines of communication, the paratroopers sowed
confusion among the German units so much that they were unable to counterattack the
invasion forces effectively at the beach head. Koskimaki notes this confusion was the
division’s true victory. Koskimaki describes the extent of the disruption:
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Reports of parachute landings over a widely scattered area from Caen on the
east, to the Brittany Peninsula on the west, Cherbourg on the north, and St. Lo
on the south, continued to upset the Germans. Reports of the landings on the
invasion beaches were considered to be diversionary tactics. It was difficult for
reinforcements to be rushed to all the reported parachute and glider landings
areas. There were just too many of these landings reported. Accounts of
landings involving men from a few lost planes often resulted in exaggerated
numbers being reported.10
The mass confusion inflicted by the airborne was more valuable than the capture of any
bridge, city or beach. However unintentional, the airborne was everywhere and
nowhere at the same time, and the German troops ran hither and yon and did not
concentrate to counterattack.

Eighty Second Airborne historian Nordyke writes:

“Because the paratroopers were so scattered, the headquarters of every German
division on the Cotentin Peninsula were receiving reports of parachute landings. This
caused the German commanders on the scene to overestimate the number of
paratroopers that had been dropped. This in turn mad them hesitant to strike decisively
until they could get a better picture of what was happening.”11 Without accurate
information on where they were attacked it was impossible for German units to move
into defensive positions.
The other fundamental tactic was individual survival. General Gavin remembers
that when landing on the ground in enemy territory, the primary focus of a paratrooper
was that of self-preservation not objectives. Gavin writes: “Then your total faculties are
concerned with survival, and that means carrying out things you have been trained to
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do as well as you possibly can.”12 Among these challenges were pulling themselves from
marshes, dismounting from trees, and locating other paratroopers.

With many

paratroopers not trying to regroup and reform after the drop, the German Army had
time to realize the importance of the bridges and the city of Carentan as well as the
other causeways bisecting the invasion front.
The German troops stationed in Normandy were trained for defensive actions
and faired well when attacked by the American airborne. Keegan writes: “The danger to
this open flank would come, it was believed, from the two German divisions which it
was known had long been stationed in the Cotentin, the 709 th on the east coast and the
243rd on the west, and the recently arrived 91st, which had unfortunately been
positioned exactly astride the airborne area. Moreover, while the 709th and 243rd were
static formations-what the Germans called bodenstandige ‘ground holding.’”13 They
heavily fortified both positions before the paratroopers attacked them. These German
troops were later found to be weak as attacking units but excelled at fortified defense
these ground holders that, as Koskimaki remembers, forced the airborne to fail
capturing some of their objectives. Koskimaki recalls, “Objectives assigned to the 101st
Airborne Division were not all taken by the end of D-Day. The bridges west of Carentan
were still held in strength by Germans who realized the importance of them for their
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own plans.”14 Among these was the 101st Airborne’s failure to capture the bridges west
of Carentan and the city itself.
Although the resolve, persistence, improvisation, and speed of the paratroopers
were the source of their success, the tools that they used were also important to their
combat prowess. These tools allowed them to accomplish their objectives, stay alive
and engage larger enemy forces. The American airborne was lucky enough to receive
some of the most innovative and modern weaponry and technology available to the
Allies and more generally some of the most advanced of the time period. Since the war
popular media has publicized the look, feel and sound of the weapons the Allies used
during D-Day.15
Paratrooper weapons such as the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) and the
Thompson sub-machinegun (Tommy gun) had been popularized through the news
coverage of the prohibition era mafia wars. Bonnie and Clyde toted the extremely
effective BAR and mobsters such as Machinegun Kelly shot his Tommy gun. Ironically,
although untested in war by 1941, they became part of the airborne’s armament in
World War Two.
The amount of equipment carried by the paratroopers on D-Day is one of the
most well known images of D-Day. Thousands of young men wearing baggy pants and
parachutes carried double or more of their body weight in equipment, rations and
weaponry. Paratrooper Fred Gordon remembers all of the equipment he had to carry
14
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on that night during his oral history with his interviewer Harold Phillips. He remembers:
“Trench tools and gun. And in combat you carried grenades with you. And, you know,
then we had a second parachute, which was a reserve chute that hung on our chest.
And, of course, when we went on the invasion, we had a pack there almost like a
backpack, you know, that we had just chuck full. It was heavy all together.” 16 The
paratroopers may not have cared for or knew what most of the equipment they carried
was for but the one thing they loved and could not live without was well known around
the world. The M1 rifle was by far the most effective tool of the American infantry
troop. The airborne jumped into combat with this weapon.
It also carried an alternate version that was modified specifically for the
airborne. The Carbine version of the M1 rifle allowed the paratrooper to fold the metal
stalk of the gun into itself. Thus, the paratrooper could jump with the rifle on him
instead of in a jump bag.17 Small alterations in the weapon’s specifications allowed the
airborne to better manipulate it in their particular circumstance. The M1 Carbine’s
space and weight saving technology allowed that particular paratrooper an
unprecedented amount of movement and control of the war’s most accurate infantry
rifle. The carbine was American ingenuity at its finest. Beevor writes: “On top of all
these smaller items came an entrenching tool and the soldier’s personal weapon,
usually a carbine with a folding stock partially disassembled in a bag known as a ‘violin
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case’ which was strapped across their chest.”18 The paratroopers issued the carbine
were far less likely to lose their weapon during the jump and could immediately enter
combat once they landed.
For the officers and NCO’s the weapon of choice was something different
entirely. The Thompson sub-machinegun was not made for accuracy. It was loaded
with high power .45-caliber ACP rounds that were fed into the fully automatic
machinegun by a stick or a drum ranging in capacity from twenty to one hundred
rounds. The Thompson was made for clearing trenches in the First World War but its
production did not matriculate fast enough. The only downside to the “Tommy Gun”
was its short range and the rate at which it used ammunition. At 1200 rounds per
minute (RPM) the Thompson went through ammunition at a very fast rate, and on DDay, ammunition replenishment was unlikely. General Matthew Ridgway jumped into
every major combat zone during the Second World War. He understood the true
necessities of paratroopers in combat. General Ridgway and the soldiers who fought all
over the African and European continents knew what equipment they needed and what
they did not. For those soldiers who participated in the combat jumps in North Africa,
Sicily and France knew that ammunition in the field comes at a high price and as such
they stocked up on as much as possible.
Paratroopers never had enough of some things while in a combat zone. They
always discussed and hoped for a hot meal, warm bed, and hot shower. Such amenities
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elevated the morale of any soldier, but they were not the most crucial items in the
preservation of a paratrooper in a combat zone. Ammunition was something with
infinite value because of its finite supply. Every round paratroopers fired meant they
had less then when they ceased firing. The paratroopers were issued 150 rounds of
ammunition on June 5, 1944. That number went quickly when in firefights or battle.
Veteran paratroopers did everything they could do supplement the amount of
ammunition they carried. Some went so far as to wear extra bandoliers around their
chests much like Mexican Revolutionary hero Pancho Villa and his soldiers. Beevor
writes: “Paratroopers also went back for extra ammunition, overloading themselves.
The greatest fear was to face an enemy with an empty gun. Bandoliers were slung
crossways over their chests ‘Pancho Villa style,’ canteens were filled to the brim, and
pouches packed with spare socks and underwear.”19 These paratroopers, understood
that if they were misdropped or unlucky, they would not be reinforced or resupplied for
days, if not weeks. Without munitions they might be forced to surrender or be outright
killed.
In the realm of technology, the army was forced to create new ways to deal with
old problems. For light parachute infantry dealing with heavy armor was always a
daunting challenge. The army could not arm the airborne with the heavy artillery or
armor necessary to destroy the light and heavy tanks deployed by the German army.
For these confrontations the Allied research-and-development teams invented the
Bazooka, the Gammon grenade, and the PIAT. Each of these weapons was created for
19
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the use by light infantry units to destroy or disable the powerful armored weapons
systems, particularly Panzer tanks, fielded by the Germans.
Perhaps the most interesting of these weapons is the Gammon grenade, which
was intended for use by a single paratrooper engaging a light to medium armored
vehicle. The sticky exterior and high explosive composition provided more than enough
explosive power to destroy even the strongest German armor. Keegan describes the
Gammon grenade: “Those were what Burgett’s blocks of TNT, Hawkins mine and
Gammon grenade (a lump of plastic explosive stuffed into a stockinet bag) were meant
to be. The Gammon grenade would, if accurately thrown, adhere to the outside of a
tank and, when it exploded, case a ‘scab’ to detach itself from the internal face of the
armor, cannon about inside the fighting compartment and kill the crew. ”20

The

paratroopers had to improvise using the weapons they had with the target they were
engaged with. Ambrose writes: “Otway destroyed the guns by dropping gammon
grenades down the barrels.”21 Another method of destroying hard targets was the
Bazooka or PIAT. This, weapon was a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) shot from a tube
about a yard long. Although safer to use than the Gammon grenade, the bazooka still
required the paratrooper to come uncomfortably close to the armored vehicle before
firing it. Its effective range was about thirty yards. Keegan notes, “The bazooka, with
which one man in each rifle squad was equipped, would achieve the same result, and at
slightly less risk to the attacker, since its range was several times greater than a grenade
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throw.”22 Another source of tank-killing fire power was the light artillery piece that the
U.S. Army dropped in Normandy but in most cases Germans captured those weapons.
Each paratrooper cross trained on the weapons carried by his comrades in his
squad or fire team. The standard parachute infantry division consisted of machine gun,
bazooka and assault teams. Weigley writes: “In the July 1943 infantry division, a rifle
company consisted of three rifle platoons plus a weapons platoon armed with two .30caliber and one .50-caliber machine guns, three 60mm mortars, and three bazookas.”23
However, the airborne also had some light artillery at its disposal. These batteries could
not be dropped directly with the paratroopers but instead had to be dropped by
themselves or with a glider. These batteries were meant to provide the airborne with a
way to counter any heavy German tank assault. The batteries were usually too big to
drop by themselves. In order to provide a solution to this problem they broke the 75
and 85mm howitzers to bundles of different pieces. Paratrooper Lewis writes: “They
had never at that time taken a 75-millimeter howitzer and broken it up into six
components, made six bundles and daisy chained it under a C-47. And then, when we
got the training to be able to do this and we got the green light, that means we went out
to the plane and jumped at the same time these 82 nd-85-millimeter howitzers were
dropped the same time we were, and it was a total failure because, as I will explain
later, we were so scattered.”24 If assembled correctly the 75 and 85mm anti-tank
artillery pieces would have allowed the paratroopers to attack German tank battalions
22
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when in defensive positions. Like the paratroopers themselves the pieces of the artillery
were widely scattered over tens of miles.

Lewis remembers: “One 75-millimeter

howitzer was put into activity that the rest of them were not. We were so scattered.”25
Unfortunately for the paratroopers most of the para-dropped artillery pieces were lost
to the marshes, captured, destroyed or lost during the scattered drop.
The .30 and .50-caliber machineguns were integral to the airborne’s tactical
offensive capabilities. Without the machineguns the paratroopers could lay down a
solid base of fire. The airborne’s heavier machineguns had to be disassembled and
dropped in separate bags.

Koskimaki illustrates a situation that occurred to PFC

Sherwood C. Trotter: “I also lost a complete .30-caliber air-cooled machine gun (I was a
gunner for 3rd platoon) which was in one of those bags the English had devised. It had
been tied to one leg and the bag also contained a couple of belts of machine-gun
ammo.”26 Few landed in France with their weapon intact. Most spent the first hour or
two of their time in France searching the dark ditches and hedgerows for a weapon, any
kind of weapon.
However advanced the weapons of the airborne were, if they could not find
them they were useless. Few common themes are as evident as the search for weapons
and equipment on D-Day. Both the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions lost the majority of
their equipment and munitions and as such spent valuable time looking for them.
Hastings writes: “Instead of a powerful paratroop unit at the assembly point, there were
25
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only a few dozen men. Richardson decided that the moment had come to make good
his lack of a weapon. He picked up a machine-gun from the bundle attached to a
collapsed parachute.”27 Paratroopers did everything they could to find a weapon as
quickly as possible. Some of the paratroopers risked their lives to locate a bundle or
lone rifle others picked up one of the many German weapons lying around. This
experience brought some undue attention to Sergeant Guarnere when he picked up a
German heavy machinegun. He remembers: “I went looking for a gun, and found a
Thompson submachine gun. I also took a German MG-42 off a dead kraut and started
shooting it, but the gun made a noise that was distinctly German. The German gun
went brrrrrrrt.

The American guns went bap-bap-bap-bap.

Every time I started

shooting it, the Americans started shooting at me! I got shot at by a dozen or so of our
own men.”28 It was not uncommon for the paratroopers to pick up German weapons in
the field. German stick grenades, Lugers and anti tank weapons were some of the most
popular pieces to acquire.
In some cases the airborne found the German made weapons to be far superior
than those of their Allied counterparts and the paratroopers did everything they could
to scavenge some German weapons, often carrying them throughout the war. One
particular case was the German antitank weapon. The Faustpetrone had a longer range
and a more powerful warhead than the American-made Bazooka. General Gavin writes:
“We were still plagued with the lack of antitank weapons. In Normandy, for the first
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time, we came across a small German rocket based on the same principle as our
bazooka. It was called ‘Fauspetrone.’ It was a shaped charge warhead slightly larger
than the bazooka. When I first found these weapons in German positions we overran, I
did not know what they were, but we soon found out when we fired them. They were
quite effective.”29 Scavenging for and successfully using enemy weapons was (and still
is) a classic practice of the guerilla combatant, which the paratroopers quickly became
on D-Day.
Speed in attack or quick response was another airborne tactic. When confronted
by enemy targets the paratroopers were adept at moving quickly between each one.
Nordyke describes an assault:
A German in a gun emplacement on the north side of the road, with tall weeds
and grass growing around it, raised up and started to draw a bead on Mattingly.
I yelled at Mattingly; and Mattingly, having been looking at Ward down the road,
looked to his right, swing his weapon around and shot the German. He emptied
the clip in his rifle, all eight rounds. He dropped his rifle to the roadbed, fell flat,
pulled out a grenade and tossed it over where that German had been standing.
Four other Germans rose up and their up their hands. Mattingly reached down
and got his empty rifle and pointed over, and five Germans directly across the
road in another gun emplacement got up and their up their hands.30
A paratrooper’s ability to quickly adjust between targets is one of the most important
traits instilled in them at jump training and boot camp. Mastery of weapons was
integral to his success and he had to fire them in a split second. That personal drive,
that ability to recover quickly from disaster enabled the airborne to score a few
successes against the German Army on June 6.
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Despite problems in execution on June 6, dropping artillery, heavy machineguns
and mortars independently of a parachute stick demonstrated the American military’s
forward thinking. The weapons and munitions gathered and used by the paratroopers
enabled them to secure the flanks of the Allied invasion on the Normandy beaches.
Once again Ambrose writes: “But although the airborne assault had not been a
complete success in the sense of accomplishing all assigned missions, the troopers had
done enough that night to justify the operation.”31 No less critical to their successes as
rangers was the bond between paratroopers in combat. Sergeant Burns remembers:
“When you’re 50 miles behind the German front, you learn to trust your own unit. You
don’t put lot of faith into promises or other outfits. However, we knew the 505th and
504th were dependable.”32
The paratrooper’s uncompromising faith in each other–their élan and cohesion-enabled them to survive the most deadly circumstances.

The popular media’s

celebration of the “brotherhood” forged through combat only touched the surface of
the emotional significance of the bond between paratroopers. Nicholas J. Cull of the
University of Leicester notes in his article “Tom Hanks and Stephen Spielberg. Band of
Brothers”: “There is plenty of evidence in Ambrose’s text and the on-screen testimony
of veterans that this is exactly how the men of Easy Company felt, but the fact that
those soldiers believed this about each other should not obscure the harder questions
about the nature of war, and specifically wars outside the European theater of World
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War II.”33 Those emotional bonds helped them cope with trauma they underwent every
day. Beevor writes: “Gavin clearly created a strong impression. One of his listeners said
that, after his quiet talk, ‘I believe we would have gone to hell with him.’”34 One of his
paratroopers exclaimed during a pre-invasion pep talk.
The weaponry, tactics, and élan used by the airborne all helped to prolong the
survival of the paratroopers in a situation where death was nearly a certainty. Without
their knowledge of a variety of weapons, their use of a variety of tactics and strategies
they would not have been as successful as they were. Although some still criticized the
efforts of the paratroopers, regardless of the training or equipment, they were still able
to act in a manner according to the reputation of the American military.

The

paratrooper’s seamless use of the knowledge imparted to them while in the United
States while in Europe only increased their image. The combination of their own elitism,
their training, and the equipment imparted to them and the foreword thinking of the
individual paratroopers themselves allowed them to succeed even where others
proclaimed that they had failed.
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Chapter 6-Conclusion
Throughout the last sixty-four and a half years controversy has surrounded the
objectives of the airborne divisions on D-Day, June 6, 1944. Before D-Day much of the
General Staff of Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower believed that the airborne
operations that they had planned would not only fail, but would cost the lives of the
paratroopers and valuable resources that could be better spent elsewhere for the
invasion effort. The General Staff believed that an early morning night drop before the
dawn beach landings would only create thousands of cut off and surrounded troops that
would later need rescuing. They believed that these forces could be better spent in
aiding the forces landing on Utah and Omaha beaches.
The controversy existing over the airborne divisions during the early hours of
June 6, 1944 is a simple one. Critics held that the airborne was unable to complete its
objectives due to extremely inaccurate drops and an inability to mobilize quickly enough
to capture the German garrisons off guard. Based upon significant research it can be
proven that most of the historical thought on the subject suggests that the paratroopers
were in fact not effective during the early morning of June 6, 1944. Critics have come to
the conclusion based on the airborne’s inability to complete all of their objectives as
well as their inability to mobilize into a coherent order of battle and move as one group
to their objectives.

There are many reasons as to why these setbacks occurred.

Historians such as S.L.A. Marshall, Napier Crookenden and Stephen E. Ambrose believe
that extremely poor drop zone conditions forced the C-47 Dakota pilots to drop their
sticks at the inappropriate times. Furthermore there was a belief that the soldiers had
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that they had survived the jump and therefore had accomplished their goals and it was
now time to survive instead of completing the objectives given to them.
Although historical thought on the subject leans toward suggesting that the
airborne operations on D-Day were not effective, the men themselves never believed
that. Although not completing all of their objectives they were still effective in that they
were able to distract, destroy and cause confusion and havoc amongst the German
garrisons all across the Norman Coast and the Cherbourg Peninsula. Memoirs from
members of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions tell a completely different story.
These brave paratroopers related a story of extreme heroism and courage under fire.
These memoirs note the confusion and terrible in accuracy of the drop itself but also tell
the ability of each individual paratrooper to regroup with other paratroopers and move
toward their objectives. The memoirs of these paratroopers paint a different picture
from what the historical record has created over the last sixty-four and a half years.
Here a clear line is drawn between what historians of the field believed and what the
paratroopers who were there believed about the actions they committed on June 6,
1944. The question as to whether or not the paratroopers were or were not effective
toward the overall success of D-Day is a complex one to answer. Based on research
from both historical texts and memoirs I will try and negotiate a clear and unbiased
answer. First, however, the history of the airborne prior to D-Day is necessary in order
to understand the circumstances in which these paratroopers fought and died in France.
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Throughout the research summarized throughout this thesis there has been an
in depth discussion as to whether or not the airborne was effective on D-Day. Whether
this question can be answered accurately or not is determined by the objectives given to
the airborne by General Eisenhower and the General Staff. Most historians write that
although the paratroopers were successful in completing the majority of its objectives
they were still unable to complete all of them. Due to the fact that the airborne was
unable to capture the bridges to the west of Carentan, secure the causeways on the
flanks of the invasion beaches and to capture the city of Carentan itself the operation as
a whole was a failure. A large grey area exists between whether or not the airborne
operations as a whole were successful and effective because they completed the
majority of their objectives or whether the paratroopers themselves failed because they
were unable to complete all of the goals given to them while in England.
The objectives given to the Airborne were intended to be as clear cut as the
order to jump when the light turned green.

Unfortunately there exists a large

controversy about what their objectives actually were. The controversy surrounds
whether or not the confusion they caused and the lines of communication they cut were
objectives or merely targets of opportunity. Although these targets of opportunity may
have been more useful than the goals given to them by the Allied commanders many
believed, at the time, that it was not enough. Many historians write that although they
were told to cause as much havoc as possible and to destroy any target of opportunity
they came upon that assignment was not one of their primary objectives.

The

paratroopers on the other hand, write less about what their objectives were and were
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not and more about the experiences that they had and the successes and failures that
went with those experiences. Some, however, do write about what their objectives
were and few actually make a note of saying that one of their primary objectives was to
create havoc and attack targets of opportunity.
No one can assume that the paratroopers were not aware of what were and
what not their objectives were. It has been said many times that the airborne was one
of the best trained, disciplined and combat ready divisions in the entire world. The
paratroopers were forced to deal with one of the worst combat jumps in the history of
the airborne. History has written the operations of the 101 st and 82nd Airborne Divisions
as a successful failure. They were able to complete the majority of their objectives. So
much so in fact that the Allied invasion forces on the beach were able to leave the beach
almost immediately after it was taken. In addition to their objectives the paratroopers
were able to create more than their fair share of havoc and confusion. They also cut a
large majority of the lines of communication that the German Army had in place. They
were also able to kill German runners carrying orders, kill commanders as they rushed
from their homes to the invasion beaches and destroyed any troops moving north
towards Utah and Omaha beaches to reinforce the static troops defend from the
invasion. Whether or not these goals were primary objectives, they were the reasons
the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions were able to do what it did.
The controversy that exists over the effectiveness of the paratroopers on D-Day
remains regardless of the amount of good that they did. The 82nd Airborne Division has
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been blamed and accused of being a diversionary tactic that cost the invasion forces
thousands of men, materials and money that could have been spent elsewhere. While
the 101st Airborne Division was blamed for being so scattered and disoriented it took
the 4th Infantry Division and the rest of the regular army weeks to find and reinforce
paratroopers trapped behind enemy lines. Both are also blamed for being unable to
reach and complete their objectives even though they had nothing to do with the
scattered drop and the evasive maneuvers the pilots were forced to take.

The

paratroopers were literally dropped into a situation that was doomed for failure. In the
eyes of their commanders and the military historians of the time the airborne could not
have been a success without the successful large scale drop and regrouping of its men.
The paratroopers themselves were able to turn the negative they were given into a
positive. Most paratroopers write about how they were less concerned with their
objectives and more concerned with surviving and regrouping. Although, few to this
day, can argue that surviving D-Day was not a success in its self. Although the men of DDay did whatever they could to survive they spent far too much time searching for a
weapon or searching for their fellow paratroopers. If the airborne had been dropped
properly by the Dakota pilots they would have been able to gather their heavy
equipment, for example light artillery pieces and heavy machineguns. However, while
surviving and regrouping the paratroopers of the airborne were able to cause significant
damage on the German Army defending the area.
The paratroopers on June 6 had little concern about the controversy because
they knew the job that they did; they are aware of the objectives they did and did not
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complete and they have heard the stories of the men of the 4 th Infantry Division while
they were on the beachheads. Historians write all about objectives and combat action
while the paratroopers who were actually there write about the sometimes heroic
sometimes lethargic experiences that they had as soon as they jumped out of the plane.
Historians such as Napier Crookenden, Stephen E. Ambrose, S.L.A. Marshall and
Cornelius Ryan were all right about what the paratroopers accomplished on D-Day.
Some write about the successes and some write about the failures but none really
discuss the paratroopers themselves and what they did. However, the historians are
very careful about the objectives that they write about. Few mention that the confusion
and havoc the paratroopers caused was a primary objective and those who do, write
about it as if it were their saving grace. As time has progressed over the last seventy
years since D-Day the perspectives of the American objectives have changed. Now,
knowing the outcome of the war, the American public and military historians alike are
less concerned with the destruction of set hard targets and objectives and far more
concerned with the importance of the actions of the young Americans.
Nevertheless Major Richard Winters, Donald Burgett and George E. Koskimaki
and many others were all paratroopers who jumped into France on D-Day. All of them
write about what their objectives were and like the historians of the field few write that
the confusion and havoc they caused were objectives.

However none of these

paratroopers write about these objectives in detail. Most only devote a paragraph or
two explaining what their major goals were. Immediately after they do this they move
on to what they were actually capable of doing. Small groups of paratroopers were
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more than capable of forming small units of two or three and attacking defensible
enemy positions or destroying lines of communication. Moreover, later in the day the
paratroopers were able to form larger units and move onto an objective. Whether or
not these objectives were assigned to them or not are not important but what was
important is that the paratroopers had little or no difficulty moving towards them and
trying to accomplish them.
The controversy surrounding the effectiveness of the airborne on D-Day has
surrounded them for the last sixty five years. The true dilemma exists within the
objectives they were assigned themselves. Historians and paratroopers alike have
difficulty deciding what was and what was not an objective.

Regardless of the

controversy history has proved one thing true. The paratroopers were able to confuse
the enemy, destroy lines of communication, capture objectives and destroy batteries of
artillery that were killing Americans on the beachheads. Although the paratroopers
were not able to complete one hundred percent of their objectives they did accomplish
their primary objective which was to allow the Allied invasion forces to leave the
beachheads. If the paratroopers were unable to accomplish anything else, that would
have been enough. In addition to that they were able to accomplish many more
objectives and caused the German Army to act as erratically as they did. In summation,
the effectiveness of the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions on D-Day is clear. They were
an extremely effective fighting force. Although they did not reform and mobilize as
expected they were still able to harass the enemy and complete objectives. Regardless
of their inability to complete all of their objectives they were able to accomplish what
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their main goal as soldiers was: kill as many of the enemy as possible and to win the
war.
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